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Law and Identifiability 
DAPHNA LEWINSOHN-ZAMIR, ILANA RITOV & TEHILA KOGUT* 
Psychological studies have shown that people react either more generously or more 
punitively toward identified individuals than toward unidentified ones. This 
phenomenon, named the identifiability effect, has received little attention in the legal 
literature, despite its importance for the law. As a prime example, while legislators 
typically craft rules that would apply to unidentified people, judges ordinarily deal 
with identified individuals. The identifiability effect suggests that the outcomes of 
these two forms of lawmaking may differ, even when they pertain to similar facts and 
situations.  
This Article is a preliminary investigation into the relevance of the identifiability 
effect for law in general, and for lawmaking in particular. Based on theoretical dis-
cussion and the findings of two original experiments, the Article argues that this 
cognitive effect should be taken into account by policy makers and decision makers. 
While measures should be adopted to reduce the impact of the effect in certain cir-
cumstances, in others the effect may be harnessed to achieve favorable social goals. 
The analysis has normative implications for major legal debates, such as the choice 
between rules and standards and between different redistributive methods.  
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INTRODUCTION 
People respond differently to identified and unidentified individuals. They might, 
for example, think that a particular miner trapped in a collapsed mine should be res-
cued at any cost but object to taxation to finance more cost-effective measures that 
would prevent such mining accidents from occurring in the first place. The particular 
miner is identified, whereas those who would benefit from preventive safety 
measures are not.1 Likewise, victims of natural disasters usually attract more gener-
ous contributions from the public when they are identifiable rather than anonymous.2 
This phenomenon, named the identifiability effect (IE), has received relatively little 
attention in the legal literature. 
This may be due, in part, to the fact that the field of behavioral law and economics 
is comparatively young.3 The growing literature tends to concentrate on certain 
psychological phenomena while mostly neglecting others. A case in point is the en-
dowment effect—that is, people’s tendency to value an entitlement that they already 
possess more than an identical entitlement that they have an opportunity to acquire.4 
Scholars have thoroughly explored the implications for legal theory of this discrep-
ancy between individuals’ selling price and their purchase price.5 Other behavioral 
phenomena that have garnered significant attention are loss aversion6 and the hind-
sight bias.7 In comparison, the IE has been largely overlooked, despite its high rele-
vance for many legal debates. One possible reason is that even the psychological 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. I. Glenn Cohen, Norman Daniels & Nir Eyal, Statistical Versus Identified Persons: 
An Introduction (describing the real-life rescue of thirty-three Chilean miners trapped 
underground), in IDENTIFIED VERSUS STATISTICAL LIVES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 
1, 1 (I. Glenn Cohen, Norman Daniels & Nir Eyal eds., 2015). 
 2. Deborah A. Small, George Loewenstein & Paul Slovic, Sympathy and Callousness: 
The Impact of Deliberative Thought on Donations to Identifiable and Statistical Victims, 102 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 143, 143 (2007).  
 3. For an early comprehensive review see generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & 
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).  
 4. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, The Endowment Effect: 
Evidence of Losses Valued More than Gains, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 
RESULTS 939, 939–47 (Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2008).  
 5. Thus, for example, scholars have argued that, contrary to the prediction of the Coase 
Theorem, the initial allocation of legal entitlements may very well affect the outcome of 
bargaining, even when transaction costs are low and wealth effects are insignificant. Russell 
Korobkin, Wrestling with the Endowment Effect, or How To Do Law and Economics Without 
the Coase Theorem, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 
300, 300–01 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014). Korobkin notes that, according to 
the Westlaw database, by the year 2012 the terms “endowment effect” and “status quo bias” 
appeared in law journal articles 1619 times. Id. at 301. 
 6. See EYAL ZAMIR, LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND MORALITY: THE ROLE OF LOSS AVERSION 
(2015) (applying loss aversion to human behavior in diverse legal contexts, and using this 
cognitive phenomenon to explain and justify basic features of the law).  
 7. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 571, 576–81 (1998). A recent Westlaw search revealed 1293 law review articles 
alluding to the term “hindsight bias.” Doron Teichman, The Hindsight Bias and the Law in 
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research on this effect is relatively new: although a few studies of the IE date back 
to the 1990s,8 most experiments have been carried out in the last decade or so.9  
The IE is the tendency of people to react more strongly toward identified individ-
uals than toward unidentified ones. In the context of monetary donations, for exam-
ple, it was found that people are significantly more willing to help someone if she is 
even minimally identified—say by a photo, name, or even a number—rather than 
completely anonymous.10 Thus, charitable contributions to aid a tsunami victim were 
larger when the person in need was identified by his or her name.11 In other contexts, 
such as blameworthy behavior, identification may turn out to be detrimental, result-
ing in people being less willing to help the person at fault12 or supportive of increas-
ing the severity of the punishment.13 Notably, identification can generate such effects 
even when it conveys no meaningful information about the individuals in question.  
Awareness of this psychological phenomenon is important for lawmaking, as 
some legal decisions are made without reference to the identity of those involved 
while others concern identified individuals. Prime illustrations are legislation and 
adjudication, respectively: while legislators typically craft rules that apply to un-
identified people, judges ordinarily deal with identified litigants. The IE suggests 
that the very existence of identification may lead to different outcomes in these two 
types of decisions. Depending on the circumstances, judgments formed with respect 
                                                                                                                 
 
Hindsight, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 
5, at 354.  
 8. E.g., Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the “Identifiable Victim 
Effect,” 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 235 (1997).  
 9. E.g., Tehila Kogut & Ilana Ritov, “One of Us”: Outstanding Willingness To Help 
Save a Single Identified Compatriot, 104 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 150 (2007) [hereinafter Kogut & Ritov, “One of Us”]; Ezra M. Markowitz, Paul 
Slovic, Daniel Västfjäll & Sara D. Hodges, Compassion Fade and the Challenge of 
Environmental Conservation, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 397 (2013); Ilana Ritov & 
Tehila Kogut, Ally or Adversary: The Effect of Identifiability in Inter-Group Conflict 
Situations, 116 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 96 (2011) [hereinafter 
Ritov & Kogut, Ally or Adversary].  
 10. See Gary Charness & Uri Gneezy, What’s in a Name? Anonymity and Social Distance 
in Dictator and Ultimatum Games, 68 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 29, 32 (2008) (demonstrating 
that knowledge of a person’s family name increases generosity in a laboratory game); Tehila 
Kogut & Ilana Ritov, The “Identified Victim” Effect: An Identified Group, or Just a Single 
Individual?, 18 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 157, 161–62 (2005) (finding that donations to a 
sick child increase when identified by a photograph); Deborah A. Small & George 
Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. RISK 
& UNCERTAINTY 5, 8–10 (2003) (showing that identification of a recipient by number 
enhances subsequent donations).  
 11. Kogut & Ritov, “One of Us,” supra note 9, at 152–53. 
 12. See Tehila Kogut, Someone To Blame: When Identifying a Victim Decreases Helping, 
47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 748, 750–51, 754 (2011) (finding that an identified AIDS 
victim who is perceived to be responsible for contracting the disease receives fewer donations 
than an unidentified one). 
 13. See Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, The Devil You Know: The Effects of 
Identifiability on Punishment, 18 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 311, 315–16 (2005) (observing 
that participants inflicted a harsher financial penalty on people who behaved uncooperatively 
in a social dilemma game when the people were identified by number). 
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to identified individuals may be either more lenient or more severe than judgments 
relating to unidentified ones. Insofar as such a divergence is undesirable, lawmakers 
should take measures to minimize it. One possible strategy is to adopt the types of 
legal norms that are less affected by identification, such as rules instead of 
standards.14  
More generally, the IE is potentially relevant to any lawmaking that involves iden-
tified and unidentified people. When lawmakers craft legal norms and choose the 
rule that would best achieve their goal, they should bear in mind that identifiability 
in the application of a given rule (or its absence) could affect the intended result. 
Some legal norms—such as rules of property, contract, and family law—regulate 
day-to-day interactions between individuals on a nonanonymous basis. Other legal 
norms—such as rules of taxation—pertain to the relationship between individuals 
and the state and involve no direct interactions between people. Thus, when lawmak-
ers consider whether to redistribute welfare in society exclusively through taxes or 
by means of rules of private law as well, they should take into account that from the 
transferors’ point of view, the beneficiaries of redistribution are unidentified in the 
former instance and identified in the latter. This factor may affect the welfare of all 
parties to the redistribution scheme and its prospects of success.15 
The little legal literature that exists on the IE has focused on health-related issues, 
such as environmental protection16 and medical care.17 Most of these studies mention 
the IE only in passing and rely on the findings of psychological experiments that 
were not tailored to legal issues.18 Indeed, to date, the IE has never been experimen-
tally examined in legal contexts. 
This Article offers a preliminary investigation of the implications of the IE for the 
law and addresses the lacuna in the literature in three ways. First, it shows that the 
IE is relevant not only to matters of life or health but to lawmaking in general, in-
cluding more common, everyday situations to which legal rules apply. Expanding 
the discussion beyond its narrow current scope demonstrates the importance of the 
IE for diverse fields of law and several legal debates. Second, the Article’s analysis 
is based on the most recent psychological findings about the IE, which have yet to 
be addressed in the legal literature.19 Third, the Article reports on the findings of two 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14. See infra notes 172–93 and accompanying text.  
 15. See infra notes 205–22 and accompanying text.  
 16. E.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in Environmental Law, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 433 (2008) (critiquing the consequences of identifiability of those harming the 
environment and nonidentifiability of those who would benefit from environmental 
regulation). 
 17. E.g., Johann Frick, Treatment Versus Prevention in the Fight Against HIV/AIDS and 
the Problem of Identified Versus Statistical Lives (discussing the IE in the context of allocating 
resources between prevention measures and treatment of people already suffering from 
AIDS), in IDENTIFIED VERSUS STATISTICAL LIVES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE, supra 
note 1, at 182. 
 18. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham, Private Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 543, 566 
n.69 (2011) (mentioning the IE as one of the reasons that malpractice suits would not solve 
the problem of optimal medical care). 
 19. Thus, for example, the legal literature neglects to point out that the IE was observed 
in experimental studies mainly with regard to a single identified individual and that this 
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original experiments by the authors, which are the first to directly test the IE in legal 
contexts.20 Specifically, our experiments examined the choices made by participants 
with respect to private law remedies and fines in two types of lawmaking—compar-
ing the judgments they made as policy makers formulating rules for unidentified 
people with their judgments as decision makers concerning certain identified indi-
viduals. We found an identifiability effect that favored the wrongdoer—namely, that 
the participants were more lenient toward wrongdoers, and more considerate of their 
interests, when responding in their capacity as decision makers than when acting as 
policy makers. This finding indicates that even minimal, meaningless identification 
may affect the legal outcome and sometimes lead to unequal treatment of similar 
cases. Such a finding has potentially far-reaching normative implications for the law. 
Before proceeding, a caveat is in order. Legal debates typically involve complex 
considerations, and this Article does not claim that considerations based on the IE 
should necessarily be decisive. However, it does argue that this cognitive phenome-
non should be taken into account, along with other relevant factors. The weight as-
signed to the IE may vary from one context to another. 
The Article is structured as follows. Part I.A surveys the existing literature on the 
IE, and Part I.B addresses explanations for this phenomenon and the limitations of 
current studies. Part II then presents our experiments and discusses our findings. Part 
III moves from positive to normative analysis. It opens with the question of whether 
the IE can—and should—be debiased.21 Next, we demonstrate the implications of 
the IE for two central legal issues: the choice between rules and standards,22 and the 
redistribution of welfare through private-law norms, alongside tax-and-transfer 
mechanisms.23 
I. THE IDENTIFIABILITY EFFECT 
Although the IE is a recently explored phenomenon, experimental studies have 
mapped its basic features, scope, and causes. Below, we review the current literature 
and note its limitations with respect to the field of law. 
A. Defining Identifiability 
Psychological studies have demonstrated that people react more strongly toward 
identifiable individuals than toward anonymous or statistical individuals. The major 
line of research on the IE examined prosocial behavior, such as monetary donations. 
It found that people are significantly more willing to help another person if the latter 
is identified rather than unidentified. Thus, for example, Kogut and Ritov elicited the 
willingness of individuals to contribute money to children who need a certain costly 
medical treatment.24 They found, inter alia, that people were willing to contribute 
                                                                                                                 
 
phenomenon may not extend to an identified group of individuals. See infra notes 38–46 and 
accompanying text.  
 20. See infra Part II.  
 21. See infra Part III.A. 
 22. See infra Part III.B. 
 23. See infra Part III.C. 
 24. Kogut & Ritov, supra note 10, at 160–62.  
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much more money to a child identified by a photo than to an anonymous child.25 
These results were replicated in experiments involving real-life contributions.26 
Importantly, identifiability increases people’s generosity toward others even 
when it conveys no meaningful information about the recipient. Knowing a person’s 
name, for example, does not really make them more familiar or deserving of help 
than an unnamed person27—and yet that is enough to induce people to allocate more 
money to them, even at their own expense.28 Charness and Gneezy demonstrated this 
in a dictator game setting, in which one player unilaterally determines how to divide 
a sum of money (the “pie”) between herself and another player. Since the recipient 
must accept whatever the dictator offers, the dictator can decide to keep all the money 
for herself.29 The authors found that although the players did not interact face-to-
face, dictators who were told the other player’s family name30 gave them a signifi-
cantly larger share of the pie—fifty percent more on average—than dictators who 
were not so informed.31 In a similar vein, Small and Loewenstein showed that even 
identifying a recipient by a number increases subsequent, anonymous monetary do-
nations to them, compared with recipients who remained completely anonymous at 
the time of the allocation decision.32 To date, the IE has been observed mainly with 
regard to human beings, although one study found this effect in relation to 
endangered animals.33  
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. Id. at 161–63. 
 26. Tehila Kogut & Ilana Ritov, The Singularity Effect of Identified Victims in Separate 
and Joint Evaluations, 97 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 106, 109 
(2005). 
 27. See also Tehila Kogut & Ilana Ritov, The Identifiable Victim Effect: Causes and 
Boundary Conditions, in THE SCIENCE OF GIVING: EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY 
OF CHARITY 133, 134 (Daniel M. Oppenheimer & Christopher Y. Olivola eds., 2011) (“[I]t is 
unlikely that social benefits will be maximized when resources are made available to identified 
victims more than to unidentified ones.”). 
 28. Charness & Gneezy, supra note 10, at 32. 
 29. Id. at 31. However, experiments with this game demonstrate that many dictators do 
not fully exploit their advantageous position and allocate a positive—albeit low—sum to the 
other player. Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe & Vernon Smith, Reciprocity in Ultimatum 
and Dictator Games: An Introduction, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 
RESULTS, supra note 4, at 411, 412–15.  
 30. The anonymity of the dictators themselves was preserved in all conditions. See 
Charness & Gneezy, supra note 10, at 32.  
 31. Id. Dictators in the totally anonymous condition only knew that the recipient was from 
a different University. Id. at 31–32. In another study, Burnham found that dictators who 
viewed a photograph of the recipient prior to their decision subsequently allocated more 
money than dictators who had not seen a photograph. Terence C. Burnham, Engineering 
Altruism: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation of Anonymity and Gift Giving, 50 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 133, 137–38, 140–41 (2003).  
 32. Small & Loewenstein, supra note 10, at 8–10; see also Donald A. Redelmeier & 
Amos Tversky, Discrepancy Between Medical Decisions for Individual Patients and for 
Groups, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1162, 1163 (1990) (finding that physicians give more weight 
to a patient’s personal interests when they consider the case of a patient identified by initials 
and more weight to the publicly oriented criterion of effectiveness when they consider 
unidentified patients as a group). 
 33. See Markowitz et al., supra note 9, at 397, 401–03 (finding an IE in the context of 
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Some experimental studies have shown that identification is not always beneficial 
to the identified person; indeed, in certain situations it can prove detrimental. Spe-
cifically, a few studies have examined the effect of identifiability on a person’s re-
action to blameworthy behavior. It was found that when an individual is seen as re-
sponsible for her own plight, identifiability heightened other people’s negative 
feelings toward her—such as anger or blame—and decreased their willingness to 
help. Kogut, for example, elicited donations for an expensive cocktail of medicines 
for people with AIDS.34 The recipient was either a single identified individual (by 
name and photo) or a group of unidentified individuals, who contracted the disease 
either as a result of drug use or by being born to a carrier mother.35 Perceived respon-
sibility for the illness significantly reduced donations only when the victim was iden-
tified.36 Similarly, Small and Loewenstein found that the identifiability of a 
wrongdoer leads to a significant increase in punishment, in comparison with an un-
identified one, even if the type of identification—number only—conveyed 
meaningless information about the wrongdoer.37 In summary, depending on the spe-
cific context, identifiability causes people to react either more generously or more 
punitively toward others.  
In reality, identified persons—in contrast to unidentified ones—are usually en-
countered as single individuals, rather than as a group.38 Such is the case, for exam-
ple, of a fundraising campaign for a person who needs a life-saving operation. When 
researchers directly tested the relevance of this factor, they found that the IE occurs 
only with regard to a single identified person (at least in certain circumstances) and 
does not extend to a group of identified people.39 Thus, in one study, Kogut and Ritov 
examined the effect of identifiability on participants’ willingness to contribute 
money to either a single sick child or a group of eight sick children.40 They found 
that while the single identified individual elicited significantly higher contributions 
than the unidentified single one, the group of identified individuals did not receive 
                                                                                                                 
 
donations to save pandas and polar bears). No one has yet tested whether an identifiability 
effect exists with regard to inanimate objects.  
 34. Kogut, supra note 12, at 749–51. 
 35. Id. at 750. 
 36. Id. at 750–51, 754; see also Tehila Kogut, The Role of Perspective Taking and 
Emotions in Punishing Identified and Unidentified Wrongdoers, 25 COGNITION & EMOTION 
1491, 1497 (2011) (showing, in a student-teacher scenario, that identifiability may either 
increase or reduce willingness to punish depending on whether the punisher adopts the 
perspective of the injured party or that of the wrongdoer).  
 37. Small & Loewenstein, supra note 13, at 315–16. In this study, the “wrongdoers” were 
participants who behaved uncooperatively in a laboratory social dilemma game. Participants 
who behaved cooperatively in the first stage of the game were given the opportunity to inflict 
a monetary penalty on either an identified or unidentified wrongdoer. Id. at 313–15.  
 38. Kogut & Ritov, supra note 27, at 134.  
 39. Id. at 134–36. 
 40. Kogut & Ritov, supra note 10, at 160–62. The authors used the same eight 
photographs of children (four boys and four girls) either separately, for the identified single 
child condition, or jointly, for the identified group condition. In the single-child scenarios, 
there was no significant difference between the contributions to each of the eight children. Id. 
at 160–61, 164.  
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higher contributions than the unidentified group.41 Moreover, the contribution to the 
single identified recipient considerably exceeded the contribution to the group of 
eight identified recipients.42 The latter, intriguing result was replicated in subsequent 
experiments.43 Some studies have demonstrated that even the smallest possible 
group—two identified members—invoked less assistance than a single identified re-
cipient.44 This phenomenon has been named the singularity effect.45  
Notably, the singularity effect has been observed even when the proportion of 
those successfully helped within the relevant reference group, and the total cost of 
providing help, remained constant. In other words, the singularity effect is not due 
to a decrease in effectiveness or an increase in cost when the number of those requir-
ing help rises.46  
Nonetheless, a few studies have found an IE in scenarios involving groups. Ritov 
and Zamir have shown that affirmative-action policies receive less support when the 
individuals who stand to lose from implementation of the policies are identified, ra-
ther than not.47 Thus, identifiability reduced respondents’ willingness to adopt pro-
cedures that adversely affect others—even when, in all the experimental scenarios, 
those affected constituted a group and not a single individual.48 In another study, 
Nordgren and Morris McDonnell examined the effect of the size of a group of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. Id. at 161–62.  
 42. Id. at 161, 164. This result was observed in studies of both hypothetical willingness 
to donate and real-life monetary contributions. Id. 
 43. Kogut & Ritov, supra note 26 (studying actual monetary contributions to an 
organization aiding cancer victims). The mean contribution for a single identified recipient 
was over twice the mean contribution for a group of eight identified recipients. There was no 
significant difference between the contributions to an unidentified single person or group. Id. 
at 109–10. 
 44. Markowitz et al., supra note 9, at 403 (observing that nonenvironmentalists 
contributed more money to help a single identified panda bear than to help two or eight 
identified bears); Paul Slovic, David Zionts, Andrew K. Woods, Ryan Goodman & Derek 
Jinks, Psychic Numbing and Mass Atrocity (reporting that monetary donations to help a single 
identified starving child were higher than those for two identified children), in THE 
BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 126, 132–33 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013). 
 45. Kogut & Ritov, supra note 26, at 114–15; Markowitz et al., supra note 9, at 398. A 
recent empirical study has observed a similar phenomenon outside the lab. See Jeff Galak, 
Deborah Small & Andrew T. Stephen, Microfinance Decision Making: A Field Study of 
Prosocial Lending, 48 J. MARKETING RES. S130 (2011). The authors examined data from 
Kiva.org, a microfinancing organization that connects borrowers and lenders through the in-
ternet and strives to alleviate poverty in the developing world. Id. at S130. The borrowers are 
either single individuals or groups. Id. They submit proposals for small uncollateralized loans 
to fund their entrepreneurial projects, describe themselves and their business, and typically 
attach photographs. Lenders review proposals online and decide whether to make an interest-
free loan and in what amount. Id. at S130–31. It was found that people prefer to lend money 
to single individuals than to groups and that loan amounts decrease as the size of the borrower 
group increases. Id. at S132–33. 
 46. See Kogut & Ritov, supra note 26, at 109–11; Markowitz et al., supra note 9, at 403. 
 47. Ilana Ritov & Eyal Zamir, Affirmative Action and Other Group Tradeoff Policies: 
Identifiability of Those Adversely Affected, 125 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 50, 53–57 (2014).  
 48. See id. at 53–55, 58. 
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victims on respondents’ perception of the severity of a crime and the appropriate 
punishment.49 The authors found, paradoxically, that increasing the number of 
people victimized by a crime—from two or three to, respectively, twenty or thirty—
actually decreased its perceived severity in the subjects’ eyes and led them to 
recommend shorter jail sentences.50 However, the differences between small and 
large groups disappeared when participants were shown a photo of one member from 
within the group51—thus demonstrating that the IE can exist in relation to groups and 
can be dependent on their size.52 Moreover, it showed that identifying a specific 
person from within a large group can elicit judgments similar to those given with 
respect to a small group. 
The significance of context to the existence and scope of the IE was further 
demonstrated in studies exploring the interaction between identifiability and percep-
tions of group belonging. In a series of experiments, Ritov and Kogut examined the 
relevance of two factors: whether the aid recipient belongs to the donor’s own group 
(in-group) or to another one (out-group), and whether the two groups are viewed to 
be in conflict.53 They found that in situations that are not perceived as involving a 
conflict, identifiability increased donations to a member of one’s own group, and 
decreased donations to an out-group member, in comparison with an unidentified 
individual.54 For example, a tsunami victim who is identified by name received larger 
monetary contributions when they belonged to the same nationality as the contributor 
(Israeli), and less aid when they belonged to a different nationality (Indian).55 More-
over, a single identified victim from the contributor’s own country received more 
help than a group of seven victims (whether identified or not) from the contributor’s 
country.56 In contrast, in scenarios perceived to involve intergroup conflict, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 49. Loran F. Nordgren & Mary-Hunter Morris McDonnell, The Scope-Severity Paradox: 
Why Doing More Harm Is Judged To Be Less Harmful, 2 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 
97 (2011). The experimental scenarios referred to financial fraud and tainted food products. 
Id. at 98–99.  
 50. Id. at 98–99. This laboratory finding was supported by archival data of actual punitive 
damages awards in toxic-tort cases. The data revealed that juries required defendants to pay 
higher punitive damages when their negligent behavior harmed fewer people. Id. at 100–01.  
 51. Id. at 99. Arguably, however, this technique was only partially successful, because 
participants should have regarded a crime toward a large group as more severe than a crime 
against a small group (rather than equally severe). Id. at 100–01. 
 52. In one experiment, after evaluating the severity of the crime (financial fraud) and 
recommending the appropriate punishment, participants were asked to imagine and describe 
one of the victims. Id. at 98–99. Participants in the small group condition described the 
hypothetical victim in greater detail than participants in the large group. Id. This finding 
supports the argument that the victims in the small group were more identifiable to the 
participants.  
 53. Kogut & Ritov, “One of Us,” supra note 9, at 152–53; Ritov & Kogut, Ally or 
Adversary, supra note 9, at 97, 99–100.  
 54. Kogut & Ritov, “One of Us,” supra note 9, at 153.  
 55. Id. at 152.  
 56. Id. at 152–53. In the out-group conditions, however, the differences between the 
contributions to a single victim and to a group of victims were not significant. Id. at 153. These 
results were replicated in a second experiment involving sick children (identified by photo-
graph) who required costly medication. Id. at 153–55. 
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identifiability increased generosity toward an individual from the opposing out-
group.57 Thus, when eliciting contributions for someone of a rival group—such as a 
member of another political faction or a fan of a competing soccer team58 
—identifying them increased people’s willingness to contribute.59 It appears that 
identifiability leads to stronger feelings of sympathy and relatedness toward a person 
from an opposing group.60 This interesting result is supported by a study on 
donations to the conservation of endangered animals,61 which found that 
identification affected only those subjects who defined themselves as non-
environmentalist.62 This suggests that when individuals do not care deeply about a 
given issue—and are therefore more likely to perceive it as conflicting with their 
own priorities—identifying a member from the out-group can increase their empathy 
and willingness to contribute to the cause.63  
B. Explanations and Limitations of Previous Studies 
What is the explanation for the IE? The chief source of this phenomenon is the 
stronger emotional reactions elicited by an identified individual.64 In the context of 
helping behavior, empathic emotions—such as sympathy, compassion, and distress 
at the plight of another—are preconditioned on adopting the other person’s perspec-
tive and imagining how he or she feels.65 This is more likely to occur when an indi-
vidual is identified rather than anonymous or statistical.66 Similarly, when blame-
worthy behavior is involved, people may find it easier to attribute responsibility or 
feel anger toward an actual, identified person than toward abstract individuals.67 Re-
searchers have also found that people process individuals and groups differently: a 
single person—unlike a group—is regarded as a psychologically coherent unit, and 
therefore stronger impressions are formed about them.68 People more readily and 
confidently make attributions and judgments about a single individual than about a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. Ritov & Kogut, Ally or Adversary, supra note 9, at 101. 
 58. Id. at 97, 100. 
 59. Id. at 98–101. Quite surprisingly, identification decreased contributions to members 
of one’s own ideological group (although overall donations to identified in-group members 
still exceeded overall donations to either identified or unidentified out-group members). Id. It 
may be that feelings of shared group belonging are very intense when the ideological element 
is salient, and consequently highlighting a specific individual can only decrease perceived 
affinity. Id. at 97, 102. 
 60. Id. at 101–02.  
 61. Markowitz et al., supra note 9, at 399, 403. 
 62. Id. at 401–02. Nonenvironmentalists were willing to donate more money to help a 
single identified polar bear than to help the entire population of polar bears. In contrast, 
subjects who defined themselves as environmentalist did not react differently toward 
identified and unidentified endangered animals and donated similar sums in both cases. Id.  
 63. Id. at 404. 
 64. Kogut & Ritov, supra note 27, at 135; Markowitz et al., supra note 9, at 398. 
 65. Kogut & Ritov, supra note 10, at 158. 
 66. Id. at 158–59. 
 67. Kogut, supra note 12, at 754; Kogut, supra note 36, at 1492. 
 68. Markowitz et al., supra note 9, at 398; Slovic et al., supra note 44, at 132. 
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group,69 so emotions are more likely to play a decisive role when the identifying 
details concern an individual than a group.70 This difference between how individu-
als and groups are perceived may explain the intriguing finding that, in some circum-
stances at least, the IE is mostly observed in relation to a single identified person, 
rather than an identified group.71 
Other, complementary explanations for the IE emphasize the importance of per-
ceptions of responsibility and effectiveness. Experimental studies have found, for 
example, that people are significantly more generous toward others when they feel 
themselves responsible for the recipient’s condition than when responsibility is po-
tentially shared with other benefactors.72 Feelings of responsibility are stronger when 
one is asked to help a particular, identified individual, rather than an anonymous 
person or a group.73 Similarly, people are more likely to contribute if they believe 
that their contribution will have an impact.74 Furthermore, the smaller the proportion 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69. David L. Hamilton & Steven J. Sherman, Perceiving Persons and Groups, 103 
PSYCHOL. REV. 336, 337–46, 351–52 (1996); Joshua Susskind, Kristin Maurer, Vinita 
Thakkar, David L. Hamilton & Jeffrey W. Sherman, Perceiving Individuals and Groups: 
Expectancies, Dispositional Inferences, and Causal Attributions, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 181, 183–86, 190 (1999); see also Clayton R. Critcher & David Dunning, Thinking 
About Others Versus Another: Three Reasons Judgments About Collectives and Individuals 
Differ, 8 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 687, 691–96 (2014) (reviewing evidence 
that people tend to be more positive in their assessments of an individual than a group and 
suggesting explanations for this phenomenon, such as stronger aversion to applying a negative 
judgment to a person than to a collective, and a functional faith in the goodness of a person as 
opposed to people in general).  
 70. Kogut & Ritov, supra note 10, at 159, 165; Kogut & Ritov, supra note 27, at 134–35. 
Some writers have offered an evolutionary explanation for the different emotional reactions 
toward individuals and groups: humans evolved and developed their emotionally based 
intuitive responses in an environment made up of small communities, where everyone knew 
one another and were often related to one another. Since they did not interact with faraway 
strangers, they did not develop similar responses toward anonymous people’s needs and 
transgressions. Furthermore, helping familiars held the promise of reciprocity and 
strengthening one’s own gene pool. Paul H. Rubin, How Humans Make Political Decisions, 
41 JURIMETRICS J. 337, 344–45 (2001). 
 71. See supra notes 38–52 and accompanying text. The above explanation for the 
different reaction toward individuals and groups is supported by a recent study on group 
entitativity. Robert W. Smith, David Faro & Katherine A. Burson, More for the Many: The 
Influence of Entitativity on Charitable Giving, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 961 (2013). The authors 
elicited monetary contributions to help poor African children. Id. at 965–66. They found that 
when a group of victims is perceived as a coherent unit, it receives greater assistance than a 
similar group with low entitativity, and is treated no differently than a single victim. Id. 
Specifically, six African children, identified by their name and photograph, received higher 
donations when they were described as belonging to the same family (siblings) than when they 
were described as a group of unrelated children. Id. at 965–66, 969–70. In contrast, there was 
no significant difference between donations to a family and to a single identified child. Id. at 969. 
 72. Cynthia E. Cryder & George Loewenstein, Responsibility: The Tie that Binds, 48 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 441, 442–43 (2012).  
 73. Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 8, at 251. 
 74. Cynthia E. Cryder, George Loewenstein & Richard Scheines, The Donor Is in the 
Details, 120 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 15, 16 (2013). 
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of those helped in relation to the size of the given reference group, the lower the 
perceived importance of helping them, even when the absolute number of those 
helped is held constant.75 Thus, in one study, subjects placed a higher priority on a 
medical project that was expected to save two lives out of four than on an identical 
project that was expected to save two lives out of 1700.76 Perception of high effec-
tiveness is likely to be particularly salient in the case of an identified, single individ-
ual: since there is only one person in the relevant reference group, helping that person 
is tantamount to a total success of the endeavor.77 In contrast, when the target of help 
is anonymous or a group, donors may feel less confident about the effectiveness of 
their contribution.78 
It is important to note that the IE is much broader than the effect commonly re-
ferred to under the heading of statistical lives—that is, people’s tendency to exces-
sively discount risks (typically to life or health) that will materialize only in the fu-
ture, to some people, with a certain probability. Since the harm has not yet occurred, 
those affected do not exist, and as such are “unidentified.” Scholars have long been 
aware of this problem. The economist Thomas Schelling was one of the first to ob-
serve that 
[t]here is a distinction between individual life and a statistical life. Let a 
six-year-old girl with brown hair need thousands of dollars for an oper-
ation that will prolong her life until Christmas, and the post office will 
be swamped with nickels and dimes to save her. But let it be reported 
that without a sales tax the hospital facilities of Massachusetts will dete-
riorate and cause a barely perceptible increase in preventable deaths 
—not many will drop a tear or reach for their checkbooks.79  
Similarly, some legal scholars have argued that the interests of statistical people 
do not receive sufficient consideration. For example, while the people burdened by 
environmental regulation—such as farmers and fishermen—are concrete and their 
resulting hardship visible, those who would die in the future from environmental 
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 8, at 238–39, 248, 252–53; Markowitz et al., supra 
note 9, at 398, 399–401.  
 76. Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 8, at 252. 
 77. Id. at 253 (observing, in the context of saving lives, that “[i]dentified victims 
constitute their own reference group, 100% of whom will die if steps are not taken to save 
them”); see also Cryder et al., supra note 74, at 17–21 (showing that tangible details about a 
charity’s activities that promote donors’ sense of impact increase their subsequent donations); 
Slovic et al., supra note 44, at 130 (reporting that people’s support for airport-safety measures 
that are expected to save 150 lives declines as the percentage of lives that would be saved is 
reduced).  
 78. Note that perceived impact is a more persuasive explanation for people’s differential 
reaction toward identified versus statistical victims. When a certain victim is anonymous but 
not statistical, then, arguably, the chances of effectively helping her are equivalent to those of 
helping an identified victim. Nonetheless, it still may be the case that people feel less sure of 
being effective when the aid recipient remains unidentified.  
 79. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in CHOICE AND 
CONSEQUENCE 113, 115 (1984). 
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degradation—such as air pollution—are abstract, and so their interests are overly 
discounted.80  
The IE pertains to any situation in which people react differently toward identified 
and unidentified persons, and therefore includes the cases discussed under “statistical 
lives.” However, it also embraces all situations in which one reacts differently toward 
highly specific and nonprobabilistic individuals—depending on whether or not they 
are identified. For example, when a charity raises donations for needy individuals 
somewhere, those beneficiaries might be either identified (say, by a photo) or left 
anonymous. In addition, the literature on statistical lives—in keeping with its 
name—focuses on risks to life or health. The IE, in contrast, is not limited to such 
cases, and is potentially relevant to any decision concerning others, including deci-
sions about everyday situations. Although most psychological experiments on the IE 
have examined it with respect to life-threatening events,81 some have documented it 
occurring when no risk to life or health was involved.  
For instance, Kogut found that educators (teachers, psychologists, and principals) 
are more willing to change their school’s regulations in favor of students, and give 
less weight to the school’s needs, when the decision pertained to a specific student 
(identified by first name only) instead of an unidentified student or a group of stu-
dents.82 The identifiability of a particular student appears to invoke a more 
individual-oriented approach—whereas nonidentifiability, or considering a group of 
students, results in a more public-oriented approach.83 Likewise, Sah and 
Loewenstein demonstrated that people in a financial conflict of interest give more 
biased advice to multiple recipients, or to a single unidentified recipient, than to a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. For a discussion of this issue, see Lisa Heinzerling, Knowing Killing and 
Environmental Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 521 (2006), and Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of 
Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189 (2000). See also W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL 
TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 19–22 (1992) (explaining how 
statistical lives are valued in policy decisions and acknowledging that “[s]ociety exhibits 
greater life valuations when saving identified lives than for policies with small effects on 
statistical lives”); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally 
Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 710, 740–41 (2005) 
(arguing, in the context of the public debate on capital punishment, that the person to be exe-
cuted is highly salient, whereas the innocents whose lives would be saved by the deterrent 
effect of the death penalty are statistical and therefore less vivid).  
 81. See, e.g., Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 8, at 247–48, 251–52 (various life-saving 
scenarios); Kogut & Ritov, “One of Us,” supra note 9, at 152 (aid to tsunami victims); Kogut 
& Ritov, supra note 26, at 109 (contributions for cancer patients); Markowitz et al., supra note 
9, at 402, 403 (saving endangered species); Slovic et al., supra note 44, at 132–33 (donations 
to starving children). For an examination of medical contexts that are not life-threatening, see 
Redelmeier & Tversky, supra note 32. The authors observed that “physicians are more likely 
to order an additional test, expend time directly assessing a patient, avoid raising some 
troubling issues, and recommend a therapy with a high probability of success but the chance 
of an adverse outcome” when the decision is made with respect to an individual patient 
(identified by initials) rather than a group of comparable patients. Id. at 1163. 
 82. Tehila Kogut, Public Decisions or Private Decisions? When the Specific Case Guides 
Public Decisions, 22 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 91, 94, 97–98 (2009).  
 83. Id. at 98–99. 
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single identified one.84 Advisors appear to experience more empathy, are more aware 
of possible bias, and have greater motivation to reduce it when their advice affects a 
single identified person.85 The documentation of an identifiability effect in contexts 
such as punishment for uncooperative behavior,86 support for affirmative action,87 
and willingness to finance an educational program for gifted children88 similarly at-
tests to the presence of the effect in instances far removed from life- and health-
threatening situations.  
Although the law regulates almost every sphere of people’s lives, and the IE is 
potentially relevant to any of these spheres, the little legal literature that exists on the 
IE is focused on health-related issues, such as medical care and malpractice,89 public 
health law,90 and environmental protection.91 Furthermore, even in this context, the 
IE is usually mentioned only in passing.92 Notable exceptions to the latter tendency 
are a full-length article on the implications of the IE for environmental law93 and a 
recently published book that resulted from a conference on identified versus statisti-
cal lives.94 Even these writings, however, focus on the field of public health95 and 
are based on early psychological studies of the IE. New experimental findings ques-
tion some of the legal analysis and recommendations.96 Moreover, the legal literature 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. Sunita Sah & George Loewenstein, More Affected = More Neglected: Amplification 
of Bias in Advice to the Unidentified and Many, 3 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 365, 
367–69 (2012). 
 85. Id. at 365, 370.  
 86. Small & Loewenstein, supra note 13, at 315–16. 
 87. Ritov & Zamir, supra note 47, at 53–57.  
 88. Kogut & Ritov, supra note 26, at 112–14.  
 89. Ronen Avraham, Clinical Practice Guidelines: The Warped Incentives in the U.S. 
Healthcare System, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 12–13 (2011) (noting that the IE may cause judges 
to overcompensate patients, even when the doctors are not negligent). 
 90. Wendy E. Parmet, Valuing the Unidentified: The Potential of Public Health Law, 53 
JURIMETRICS J. 255, 255 (2013) (discussing the limited ability of public health law to protect 
the health of the unidentified, general population).  
 91. Shi-Ling Hsu, Fairness Versus Efficiency in Environmental Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
303, 332–35 (2004) (arguing that due to the IE, fairness analysis favors the identified polluter, 
who would be adversely affected by environmental regulation). 
 92. E.g., Avraham, supra note 18, at 566 n.69 (citing the IE as one reason that malpractice 
suits do not solve the problem of optimal medical care); Stephen M. Johnson, Competition: 
The Next Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 18 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 15 (2009) (noting 
that since the people adversely affected by environmental regulation are identified, whereas 
those that would benefit from the regulation are not, the latter’s interests are excessively 
discounted). 
 93. Hsu, supra note 16. 
 94. I. Glenn Cohen, Normal Daniels & Nir Eyal, Acknowledgements, in IDENTIFIED 
VERSUS STATISTICAL LIVES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at ix. 
 95. The applications discussed in Identified Versus Statistical Lives focus on 
environmental class actions and regulation, and the fight against HIV/AIDS. Id. at 161–218. 
 96. For instance, Hsu assumes that the IE is equally applicable to an identified individual 
and an identified group. Hsu, supra note 16, at 437, 440; see also Cohen et al., supra note 1, 
at 1–2 (defining the identifiability bias as a greater inclination to assist identified persons and 
groups than unidentified persons and groups). Therefore, Hsu claims that by identifying the 
group of beneficiaries of environmental regulation, we can overcome the bias in favor of those 
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on the IE is entirely theoretical—that is to say, based on general psychological stud-
ies of the effect that did not test law-related issues. Indeed, to date, the IE has not 
been examined directly in legal contexts.  
To fill the gap in the literature, the following Parts discuss lawmaking in general. 
Expanding the discussion beyond its rather narrow current scope underscores the 
importance of the IE for the law.  
 II. TESTING THE IDENTIFIABILITY EFFECT IN LEGAL CONTEXTS 
To demonstrate the significance of the IE for the law in general, we focused our 
experiment on the basic distinction between two types of lawmaking—policy mak-
ing and decision making—which cuts across fields of law and legal debates. Further-
more, to extend the study of the IE beyond life and health matters, we tested its inci-
dence with regard to more common, less dramatic situations—namely, legal 
remedies in various areas of private law and fines for relatively minor offenses.  
A. New Experiments 
When legal decisions are made, the affected individuals may be either identified 
or unidentified. Our experiments aimed to examine whether an identifiability effect 
occurs in this context—namely, whether the decisions of those who formulate the 
rules differ from the decisions of those who apply them to specific cases. The former 
category includes legislators and regulators (policy makers), and the latter includes 
judges, among others (decision makers).97  
Typically, when policy makers set rules or establish guidelines, the people who 
are affected by them are unidentified. In contrast, when these rules and guidelines 
are subsequently applied by decision makers, they usually affect identified individ-
uals, such as particular plaintiffs and defendants. Moreover, decision makers usually 
encounter such people as individuals rather than as a group, which may also trigger 
the singularity effect. Although policy making and decision making in real life are 
plausibly influenced by several factors, a central feature that distinguishes these two 
types of lawmaking is the existence (or absence) of identifiability. Our experiments 
focus on this main differentiating characteristic. 
                                                                                                                 
 
economically burdened by such regulation. Hsu, supra note 16, at 482–85. However, as 
explained above, new experimental findings suggest that the IE may not be observed with 
regard to groups, in contrast to single individuals. See supra notes 38–46 and accompanying 
text. Consequently, in the former case, identification may have a different effect than com-
monly assumed in the legal literature. 
 97. Of course, judges are not the only ones to apply rules to specific cases. The activities 
of administrative agencies may include both rulemaking and adjudication. Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus Adjudication: A Psychological Perspective, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 529, 529–32 (2005). Therefore, here and throughout this Article, the term “decision 
maker” refers to any lawmaking official who makes judgments with regard to identified, 
specific individuals.  
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Experiment 1 
In the first experiment, we sought to discover whether minimal identification 
would affect the resulting decision by presenting respondents with a certain legal 
issue from the perspective of either a policy maker or a decision maker. The scenarios 
pertained to various matters of private law, and respondents were asked to decide the 
appropriate remedy against someone who had infringed upon another person’s right. 
For example, respondents had to determine whether to order specific performance or 
payment of damages for breach of contract or to reduce a damages award because 
the injurer is poor. The policy-making versions related to unidentified individuals. 
The identifying information in the decision-making versions was minimal and ir-
relevant to the decision—the first name of the parties to the conflict. Our first, gen-
eral hypothesis was that the IE is a broad phenomenon that is not limited to life and 
health contexts. Therefore, it will manifest itself also in legal decision making that 
applies to common, everyday situations, such as breach of a commercial contract. 
The second, more specific hypothesis was that policy makers’ judgments regarding 
the appropriate remedy would differ from those of decision makers, even when they 
pertain to similar facts and situations. We had no clear hypothesis as to whether iden-
tification (in the decision-maker versions) would lead to more lenient or to harsher 
treatment of the rights infringer. On the one hand, a few studies have found that 
identification can be detrimental to the identified person when blameworthy behavior 
is involved.98 On the other hand, most studies of the IE showed that identification is 
advantageous.99 We thus sought to discover whether identification would impact the 
right infringer’s treatment, and if so, in what direction.100 
Participants. A total of 522 students from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
and Ben-Gurion University—34.5% men and 65.5% women—took part in the ex-
periment. Of these, 80% were undergraduates, 16% were graduate students, and 4% 
were unspecified. They ranged in age from eighteen to sixty-two, with a mean of 
twenty-five. Of the 522 respondents, 409 answered a comprehension question cor-
rectly. We report the analyses of the data from these respondents in the main text 
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
 99. See supra notes 24–33 and accompanying text.  
 100. To date, as described above, there is scant experimental literature that tested the IE in 
the context of policy making versus decision making and none that has examined this issue in 
legal settings. Redelmeier and Tversky focused on the decisions of physicians and did not 
mention the IE as such. Redelmeier & Tversky, supra note 32. They found that physicians 
give more weight to the personal concerns of the patient when they consider an individual 
patient and more weight to general criteria of effectiveness when they consider patients as a 
group. Id. at 1163. Kogut examined the decisions of school educators with respect to their 
school and found that consideration of a certain pupil evoked a more private-oriented approach 
while consideration of a group of pupils resulted in a more public-oriented approach. See supra 
notes 82–83 and accompanying text. Importantly, in both the identified and unidentified 
scenarios, the educators’ decisions were applicable to a particular school. Kogut, supra note 
82, at 9394. In other words, this study did not examine general policy making that would be 
applied to specific cases by others in the future. 
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below. Analyses of the entire sample yielded very similar results and are reported in 
a footnote.101 
Experimental Design. The experiment involved five types of scenarios: damage 
to property caused by a poor person’s cow; good-faith encroachment on another per-
son’s land; breach of a sales contract in order to mitigate losses; breach of a sales 
contract in order to make extra profits; and defamation. Each of the five scenarios 
had two judgment versions: one as a policy maker, the other as a decision maker.102 
The type of scenario and type of judgment varied from one participant to the next 
—that is to say, each participant was given only one scenario, from the perspective 
of either a policy maker or a decision maker. Participants were asked to choose the 
appropriate remedy against a rights infringer from among five options (marked 1 
to 5). In all the scenarios, the options were ordered from the harshest, least 
considerate of the injuring party’s interests (option 1) to the mildest, most considerate 
one (option 5). In addition, we asked participants to indicate, on a scale from 1 (Not 
at all) to 7 (Very much), the degree to which they felt three types of emotion—anger, 
sympathy, and pity—toward the rights holder and the rights infringer, and the degree 
to which consideration of the injurer’s interests, as depicted, was fair. The order of 
the emotion questions was counterbalanced between subjects using two presentation 
orders.103 Thus, the experiment included a total of 20 different questionnaires (5 
vignettes x 2 types of judgment x 2 emotion orders). 
The questionnaires were posted on a website designed for controlled judgment 
and decision-making experiments. Participants were students from diverse fields 
who had expressed willingness to answer online questionnaires. They were invited 
by e-mail to log onto the website and fill out a questionnaire. The different question-
naires were randomly assigned to the participants as they logged on. To encourage 
participation, the participants were entered into a lottery to win fifteen prizes of fifty 
shekels each.104 
The two versions of the breach-of-contract-to-mitigate-losses scenario may serve 
as an illustration of the wording of the vignettes. The policy-maker version read as 
follows: 
Imagine that you have to lay down the rules that would apply in cases in 
which sellers breach a contract to sell an asset, such as iron products, to 
buyers. Sometimes, after the formation of a contract with a certain buyer, 
the seller realizes that the costs of production are higher than he expected 
and that he would lose money if he performs the contract. The seller may 
then decide to breach the contract with the buyer and not supply the iron. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. While a 21.6% failure rate in the comprehension question may seem high, it is not 
uncommon when respondents are not inherently motivated to answer a questionnaire dili-
gently. See Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Tom Meyvis & Nicolas Davidenko, Instructional Ma-
nipulation Checks: Detecting Satisficing To Increase Statistical Power, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 867 (2009) (discussing the use of manipulation checks in experiments and re-
porting a 28.7% failure rate). The percent of correct answers did not differ between policy 
makers and decision makers (78.5% and 79%, respectively). 
 102. See infra App. A for the full text of the vignettes.  
 103. That is to say, half the participants indicated their emotions toward the injuring party 
first, and the other half toward the injured party first.  
 104. One New Israeli Shekel is approximately equal to $0.25. 
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In such cases, the buyer may be awarded one of two remedies. One pos-
sibility is to grant specific performance—that is, to order the seller to 
supply the iron to the buyer. Another possibility is to require the seller 
to pay the buyer monetary damages for all the losses the buyer incurred 
due to nondelivery of the iron on time, including the inconvenience of 
purchasing substitute iron from another supplier and the increase (in the 
event that there is one) in the market price of iron. 
You have to establish guidelines on whether to grant specific perfor-
mance or monetary damages in such cases. Please choose one of the fol-
lowing options: 
1. An order for specific performance of the contract with the buyer 
should be issued, irrespective of the magnitude of the seller’s ex-
pected loss from performing the contract. 
2. An order for specific performance of the contract with the buyer 
should be issued, even if the seller’s expected loss from performing 
the contract is high.  
3. An order for specific performance of the contract with the buyer 
should not be issued if the seller’s expected loss from performing the 
contract is high.  
4. An order for specific performance of the contract with the buyer 
should not be issued, even if the seller’s expected loss from perform-
ing the contract is low.  
5. An order for specific performance of the contract with the buyer 
should not be issued in any case, but rather an order for monetary 
damages.  
The decision-maker version read as follows: 
Imagine that you have to determine the remedy that would be given in a 
case in which Michael breached a contract to sell iron products to Ethan. 
After the formation of the contract with Ethan, Michael realized that the 
costs of production are higher than he expected and that he would lose 
money if he performed the contract. Michael breached the contract with 
Ethan and did not supply the iron. Ethan may be awarded one of two 
remedies. One possibility is to grant specific performance—that is, to or-
der Michael to supply the iron to Ethan. Another possibility is to require 
Michael to pay Ethan monetary damages for all the losses Ethan incurred 
due to nondelivery of the iron on time, including the inconvenience of 
purchasing substitute iron from another supplier and the increase (in the 
event that there is one) in the market price of iron. 
You have to decide whether to grant specific performance or monetary 
damages. Please choose one of the following options:  
1. I would order specific performance of the contract with Ethan, ir-
respective of the magnitude of Michael’s expected loss from perform-
ing the contract. 
2. I would order specific performance of the contract with Ethan, even 
if Michael’s expected loss from performing the contract is high.  
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3. I would not order specific performance of the contract with Ethan, if 
Michael’s expected loss from performing the contract is high.  
4. I would not order specific performance of the contract with Ethan, 
even if Michael’s expected loss from performing the contract is low.  
5. I would not order specific performance of the contract with Ethan in 
any case, but rather an order for monetary damages.  
The other four types of events similarly presented participants with a legal issue 
from either a policy-making or decision-making perspective and asked them to 
choose between five options with regard to the appropriate private law remedy. 
Results. To compare the distribution of responses in the two roles (policy maker 
versus decision maker), we treated the responses as ratings on a numerical scale, 
ranging from 1 (harshest) to 5 (mildest). The results, as shown in Figure 1 below, 
confirmed our hypothesis: across scenarios, decision makers, whose judgment per-
tained to a specific identified person, were more lenient toward the injurer than pol-
icy makers, whose judgement pertained to unidentified injurers (Kruskal-Wallis—a 
nonparametric test for comparison of the distribution of two groups—yielded a 
highly significant result, p = .006).105 Indeed, across the five scenarios the modal re-
sponse among the decision makers was the most lenient one (option 5), whereas the 
modal response in the policy-maker conditions was the second-harshest one (option 
2). A more detailed analysis employed an ANOVA of the rating by the respondent’s 
assigned role and scenario. The effect of role was statistically significant (F(1, 399) 
= 6.988, p = .009).106 Furthermore, while the magnitude of the gap between the judg-
ments of policy makers and decision makers appeared to vary between the five sce-
narios, the different scenarios were not significantly different from each other with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. A Kruskal-Wallis test relies only on the rank order of the responses, without making 
assumptions about the normality of their distribution. 
 106. Similar results were observed in the entire sample: F(1, 509) = 6.868, p = .009. 
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524 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:505 
 
respect to that gap107: across scenarios, decision makers gave more weight to the 
injuring party’s interests than policy makers did.108  
To examine the respondents’ emotions toward the injurer and the injured in each 
scenario, we computed an emotion scale by subtracting the rating of the negative 
emotion (anger) from the averaged rating of the positive emotions (pity and sympa-
thy): the higher the computed average, the more overall positive the emotions evoked 
by the target. Across the scenarios, while the injured party evoked greater overall 
positive emotions than the injurer among the policy makers, for the decision makers 
there was no significant difference.109 
Judgment of fairness was correlated with the decision (r = .526, p < .001). Not 
surprisingly, respondents who thought it more fair to take into account the injurer’s 
interests tended to be more lenient toward the injurer in their decision. The judgment 
of fairness varied between scenarios but was not affected by the respondent’s role.110 
Furthermore, repeating the analysis of the decision by role and scenario, while con-
trolling at the same time for fairness and emotions, still yields a significant effect of 
role.111 Thus, the difference between the decisions of policy makers and decision 
makers cannot be fully accounted for either by their emotions or by considerations 
of fairness. 
Turning to the specific scenarios, the breach-of-contract-to-mitigate-losses vi-
gnette (scenario 3, quoted above) involved a judgment about the appropriate remedy 
when a contract for the delivery of iron is breached. Respondents had to choose be-
tween specific performance and expectation damages.112 We found that policy mak-
ers were more inclined to the view that specific performance should be granted, even 
when losses to the seller from performing the contract were significant. In contrast, 
decision makers, who were faced with an identified losing seller, were more inclined 
to award monetary compensation to the buyer, even when the losses from perfor-
mance in kind were not very high. 
It is interesting to compare this scenario with the breach-of-contract-to-make-
extra-profits scenario (scenario 4). This vignette was identical to scenario 3 in all 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. F(4, 499) = .632, p = .640. Similar results were observed in the entire sample: 
F(4, 509) = 1.169, p = .324. 
 108. Gender did not significantly interact with any of the factors. 
 109. Although qualified by further interactions with order of questions and scenario, role 
interacted with target (F(1, 389) = 10.374, p = .001). Separate comparisons for policy makers 
and decision makers (across scenarios) yielded a significant difference between feelings for 
injured and injurer (.640 and .138, for injured and injurer, respectively; t(193) = 2.725, 
p = .007) among policy makers, while the corresponding comparison among decision makers 
did not yield a significant difference (.508 and .366, respectively; p = .4). 
 110. The only significant effects in an ANOVA of fairness by role, scenario, and question 
order were those of scenario (F(1, 389) = 6.044, p < .001) and order (F(1, 389) = 5.655, 
p = .018). No other main effects or interactions yielded significant results. 
 111. ANOVA of decision by role and scenario, with fairness judgment, feelings toward 
injurer, and feelings toward injured as covariates, yields significant effects of role 
(F(1, 396) = 5.048, p = .025) and of fairness (F(1, 396) = 139.494, p < .001). No other effects 
are significant. 
 112. Expectation damages are the sum of money that would put the injured party “in as 
good a position as [she] would have been in had the contract been performed.” 3 E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 190 (3d ed. 2004).  
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respects, except for the motivation for the contract breach: while in scenario 3 it was 
to mitigate losses, in scenario 4 it was because the seller had found another buyer 
who was willing to pay more for the iron, thereby yielding him a greater profit. Even 
though a breach for the purpose of increased gain might be perceived as morally less 
justified than a breach to avoid out-of-pocket losses,113 decision makers still tended 
to be more lenient toward the breaching party than policy makers were—that is, they 
were more willing to award monetary compensation in lieu of specific 
performance.114  
Besides breach of contract, the experiment also examined remedies for defama-
tion, damage to property by a person’s cow, and good-faith encroachment on land. 
In the defamation scenario (scenario 5), respondents were told that when someone 
besmirches another person’s good name, the injured party usually suffers not only a 
pecuniary loss, but an emotional one, as well. The emotional loss may be dealt with 
either by increasing the amount of monetary compensation or by requiring the injurer 
to publicly apologize. Participants were asked to choose between five options, rang-
ing from the one that most infringes upon the libeler’s autonomy to the one most 
considerate of his autonomy. Thus, an apology could be always required; required 
even when the emotional loss is relatively small; required only when the loss is sig-
nificant; required only when it is severe; or never imposed upon the libeler.115 Par-
ticipants made their judgment either as policy makers setting guidelines in this matter 
                                                                                                                 
 
 113. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in 
Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405, 413–14, 420–21 (2009) (finding that 
people view breach of contract to attain greater profits as more immoral than a breach aimed 
at cutting losses and therefore think that, in the former case, the injured party should receive 
damages surpassing her losses); see also EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS, 
AND MORALITY 265 (2010) (“While many people might justify nonperformance in impossibil-
ity-like situations, it is doubtful that they would justify it when nonperformance is not meant 
to avoid losses but rather to facilitate larger profits.”).  
 114. The greater tendency of decision makers to suffice with a monetary remedy seems to 
accord with the efficient breach doctrine. In a nutshell, this doctrine holds that a promisor may 
breach a contract whenever breach is more efficient than performance; that is, whenever the 
promisor’s profits from the breach exceed the losses to the promisee. ROBERT COOTER & 
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 328–30 (6th ed. 2012). In scenario 4, the breach is 
presumably efficient because the asset is transferred to the person who values it most (the 
second buyer) while minimizing transaction costs, and the first buyer is fully compensated. 
For criticism of the efficient-breach doctrine from a behavioral and experimental perspective, 
see Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Can’t Buy Me Love: Monetary Versus In-Kind Remedies, 2013 
U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 159–63, 169–74, 178–84.  
 115. In some countries, such as Japan and South Korea, apologies can be coerced. Pierre-
Dominique Ollier & Jean-Pierre Le Gall, Various Damages, in 11 INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW pt. 2, at 1, 89–93 (André Tunc ed., 1986). In contrast, 
the remedy of court-ordered apology is generally unavailable in civil proceedings in the United 
States. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, John M. Darley & Robert J. MacCoun, Symbolism and 
Incommensurability in Civil Sanctioning: Decision Makers as Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1121, 1147 n.114 (2003). However, voluntary apologies and retractions of defamatory 
statements can be offered by defendants in mitigation of damages. Hiroshi Wagatsuma & 
Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 
20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 461, 479–80 (1986).  
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or as decision makers who must award either of the two remedies in a specific case. 
As in the breach-of-contract scenarios, decision makers were more considerate of the 
libeler than policy makers were. Decision makers required a somewhat larger emo-
tional loss to coerce an apology.  
A similar tendency was revealed in the damage-to-property scenario (scenario 1), 
involving damage caused by livestock to a neighboring property. Respondents had 
to decide whether the cow owner’s financial circumstances should affect the sum of 
compensation to be paid.116 In the policy-maker version, respondents were asked to 
set the guidelines on the extent to which the injurer’s financial situation should be 
taken into account. In the decision-maker version, they had to determine whether the 
compensation paid by a certain cow owner should be reduced. The five options were 
as follows: no reduction in compensation; a reduction only if the sum of damages is 
very high; only if it is quite high; even if the sum is quite low; and a reduction in all 
instances where the injurer is financially constrained. Once again, decision makers 
faced with an identified poor injurer were more willing to reduce the damages to be 
paid than policy makers who dealt with unidentified poor injurers. Policy makers 
tended to condition a reduction of damages on the existence of a higher compensa-
tion burden.  
Finally, the encroachment-on-land scenario (scenario 2) depicted individuals 
who—unintentionally and in good faith—have built on someone else’s land without 
permission. The two possible remedies were demolishing the building (and returning 
the land to its former state) or compensating the landowner (while allowing the build-
ing to remain).117 The five options linked the demolition option to the value of the 
encroaching building in relation to the value of the land on which it was built. For 
example, respondents could order demolition irrespective of the value of the build-
ing; allow the building to remain only if its value surpasses that of the encroached 
land; allow the building to remain even if its value is less than that of the encroached 
land; and so forth. Although the difference between the judgments of decision mak-
ers and policy makers was slight, the same pattern was observed: decision makers 
were more considerate of good-faith encroachers than policy makers and made 
demolition of the building contingent on it being of somewhat lesser relative value 
than the land in question. 
Experiment 2 
The remedial options in Experiment 1 were ordered from the harshest remedy, 
least considerate of the injuring party’s interests, to the mildest, most considerate 
remedy. Nevertheless, the various remedies involved different attributes, which 
could arguably receive different subjective weights. In order to test for the generality 
of the effect found in Experiment 1 and remove any alleged ambiguity in the remedy 
rankings, we ran a second experiment with different scenarios, in which only an in-
crease or a decrease in a certain fine was to be decided. This was done in the context 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. Possessors of livestock are held strictly liable for the damage caused by their intruding 
animals. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 504(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). Thus, there is no 
need to prove that the animal owner was negligent.  
 117. For discussion of different remedies for land encroachment, see Stewart E. Sterk, 
Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 80–81 (1987).  
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of sanctioning first-time versus repeat offenders. Furthermore, unlike the civil dis-
putes depicted in the first experiment, in the context of fines, attending to the interests 
of the identified wrongdoer does not come at the expense of any other person, identi-
fied or not. 
In Experiment 2, we sought to discover whether minimal identification would 
affect a decision regarding the appropriate size of a fine when subjects consider the 
question as either policy makers or decision makers. The experiment inquired 
whether the fact that this is the wrongdoer’s first offense should reduce the fine to be 
paid, and, vice versa, whether a repeat offense should lead to an increase in the fine. 
As in Experiment 1, the policy-making versions related to unidentified individuals 
and the identifying information in the decision-making versions was minimal and 
irrelevant to the subsequent decision—the first name of the wrongdoer. We hypoth-
esized that policy makers’ judgments regarding the amount of the fine would differ 
from those of decision makers. We aimed to find out whether the leniency toward an 
identified wrongdoer (observed in Experiment 1) would be replicated in the context 
of fines and whether repeat offenders would be treated differently than first-time 
offenders. 
Participants. A total of 488 students from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
and Ben-Gurion University—33.2% men and 66.8% women—took part in the ex-
periment. Of these, 84% were undergraduates, 15% were graduate students, and 1% 
were unspecified. They ranged in age from eighteen to sixty-two, with a mean of 
twenty-five. Of the 488 respondents, 410 answered a comprehension question cor-
rectly. We report the analyses of the data from these respondents.118 
Experimental Design. The experiment employed a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subject de-
sign. Two scenarios were used: littering in a public park and violating the conditions 
of a building permit. Each scenario had a first-time-offense version and a repeat-
offense version. In addition, each of the resulting four scenarios had two judgment 
versions: one as a policy maker, the other as a decision maker. Each participant re-
ceived only one scenario, from the perspective of either a policy maker or a decision 
maker, and was asked to determine the appropriate fine from among five options 
(marked 1 to 5). The options involved either a decrease (in the first-time-offense 
conditions) or an increase (in the repeat-offense conditions) in fines. Option 1 repre-
sented no reduction/increase in the fine, and option 5 represented a very large 
reduction/increase in the fine. In addition, we asked participants to indicate, on a 
scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much), the degree to which they felt three types 
of emotion—anger, identification, and pity—toward the wrongdoer and how severe 
they perceived the offense to be.119 
The questionnaires were posted on the same website as in Experiment 1, and stu-
dents from diverse fields were invited to answer an online questionnaire by the same 
method as in the first experiment.  
Two examples from the littering-in-the-park scenario may illustrate the wording 
used in the vignettes. The first-time-offense, policy-making version read as follows: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. Analyses of the entire sample yielded very similar results. See infra note 121. 
 119. For the full text of the vignettes, see infra app. B. 
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Imagine that you have to lay down the rules that would apply in cases in 
which people litter in public parks. As a rule, littering in a park is subject 
to a fine. However, when determining the fine to be paid, one can take 
into account various factors that would reduce the amount to be paid.  
You have to establish guidelines on whether, in such cases, to take into 
account the fact that it is a first-time offense and reduce the fine to be 
paid by a person who littered in a park. Please choose one of the follow-
ing options: 
1. I would stipulate that the fine should not be reduced at all because it 
is a first-time offense of a litterer.  
2. I would stipulate that the fine should be reduced to a small extent be-
cause it is a first-time offense of a litterer.  
3. I would stipulate that the fine should be reduced to a medium extent 
because it is a first-time offense of a litterer.  
4. I would stipulate that the fine should be reduced to a large extent be-
cause it is a first-time offense of a litterer.  
5. I would stipulate that the fine should be reduced to a very large extent 
because it is a first-time offense of a litterer.  
The repeat-offense, decision-making version read as follows: 
Imagine that you have to determine the fine to be paid by Daniel, who 
littered in a public park. As a rule, littering in a park is subject to a fine. 
However, when determining the fine to be paid, one can take into account 
various factors that would increase the amount to be paid.  
You have to decide whether to take into account the fact that it is a repeat 
offense of Daniel and increase the fine that he would pay. Please choose 
one of the following options: 
1. I would not increase the fine at all because it is a repeat offense of 
Daniel, the litterer.  
2. I would increase the fine to a small extent because it is a repeat offense 
of Daniel, the litterer.  
3. I would increase the fine to a medium extent because it is a repeat 
offense of Daniel, the litterer.  
4. I would increase the fine to a large extent because it is a repeat offense 
of Daniel, the litterer.  
5. I would increase the fine to a very large extent because it is a repeat 
offense of Daniel, the litterer.  
Results. To compare the distribution of responses in the two roles (policy maker 
versus decision maker), we treated the responses as ratings on a numerical scale, 
ranging from 1 (harshest) to 5 (mildest). For that purpose we inverted the scale in the 
repeat offense conditions, such that the largest increase of the fine gets the value of 
1, and the no-increase gets the value of 5.  
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The results, as shown in Figure 2 below, confirmed our hypothesis: across 
scenarios and first-time/repeat offense, decision makers, whose judgment pertained 
to an identified person, were more lenient toward the wrongdoer than policy makers, 
whose judgement pertained to unidentified wrongdoers. 
An ANOVA of the rating by the respondent’s assigned role (policy maker versus 
decision maker), scenario, and first-time/repeat offense, yielded a statistically signif-
icant effect of role (F(1, 402) = 4.052, p = .045). Although the gap between the judg-
ments of policy makers and decision makers appears to be larger for repeat offenders 
than for first-time offenders, the interaction between role and first/repeat offense was 
not statistically significant (p > .2). No other effects approached a significant level,120 
except for a marginally significant three-way interaction of role, scenario, and 
first/repeat offense (F(1, 410) = 3.735, p = .054). This suggests that the gap between 
policy makers and decision makers regarding the treatment of first-time offenders is 
more pronounced in the building-violation scenario than in the littering-in-the-park 
scenario.121  
                                                                                                                 
 
 120. Thus, for example, in terms of the extent of leniency, we observed no significant dif-
ference between first-time and repeat offenders. Note, however, that since leniency toward 
first-time offenders means reducing the fine, whereas leniency toward repeat offenders means 
attenuating the increase in the fine, a nonsignificant difference in leniency between the two 
categories of offenders does not mean that their level of punishment is the same.  
 121. Repeating the same analysis with all respondents yields similar results with respect to 
the main effect of role (F(1, 480) = 3.836, p = .05). In this analysis, the effect of first/repeat 
offense is also significant (F(1, 480) = 10.554, p = .001). As in the analysis reported above, 
here too the three-way interaction of role, scenario, and first/repeat offense is marginally sig-
nificant (F(1, 480) = 3.649, p = .057). 
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The respondents’ perspective—policy maker or decision maker—did not signifi-
cantly affect their judgment of the severity of the offense. Judgment of severity var-
ied significantly by scenario (F(1, 402) = 17.694, p < .001), where littering in a park 
was regarded as more severe than a building violation, and by first/repeat offense 
(F(1,402) = 15.579, p < .001), where, as expected, a repeat offense was considered 
to be more severe than a first-time offense. However, role did not significantly affect 
severity judgments (p = .203), nor did it interact with the other factors. While judg-
ment of severity was not affected by role, evoked emotions seem to depend on one’s 
perspective. To examine the respondents’ emotions toward the wrongdoer in each 
scenario, we computed, as in Experiment 1, an emotion scale by subtracting the rat-
ing of the negative emotion (anger) from the averaged rating of the positive emotions 
(pity and identification); the higher the computed average, the more overall positive 
the emotions evoked by the target. Across scenarios, the wrongdoer evoked greater 
overall positive emotions among the decision makers than among the policy makers 
(F(1, 402) = 5.294, p = .022). Furthermore, the effect of perspective on leniency 
judgments was mediated in this study by the evoked emotions: including the emotion 
rating as a covariate in the model predicting leniency from the three independent 
factors renders the effect of role nonsignificant (p = .222). This result suggests that 
the source of the gap in leniency between policy makers and decision makers stems 
from the more positive emotional reaction experienced by decision makers who face 
an identified wrongdoer. 
B. Discussion 
The experiments found a similar pattern in all scenarios: the respondents’ deci-
sions were affected by whether the individuals in question were identified or not. In 
both private law and fine scenarios, the respondents’ judgments as policy makers 
with regard to unidentified people differed from their judgments as decision makers 
with regard to identified individuals. Specifically, identifiability resulted in more le-
nient treatment of the identified wrongdoer. Thus, for example, decision makers were 
more willing than policy makers to refrain from ordering specific performance of a 
losing contract, and to avoid ordering a libeler to apologize. An identifiability effect 
was triggered even though, in the decision maker version of each scenario, the infor-
mation about the individual in question was minimal and conveyed no meaningful 
data: identification by no more than a first name. More generally, the experiments 
demonstrated that the IE is a powerful phenomenon that extends beyond the fairly 
limited contexts tested in the literature to date. This psychological effect is therefore 
highly relevant to the field of law and is not limited to situations involving risks to 
life or to health. Below, we highlight a few more aspects of our experimental 
findings. 
A few studies of the IE have demonstrated that identification is not always advan-
tageous but can be detrimental to the identified person when her behavior is per-
ceived to be blameworthy: it may, for example, trigger a more punitive reaction, even 
if the identifying information is minimal.122 Interestingly, in our experiments we did 
not observe such a reaction. Although all the scenarios in both experiments involved 
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text.  
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remedies or sanctions against wrongdoers, we found that identifiability always re-
sulted in more favorable treatment of the wrongdoer. Even when the issue was 
whether to increase the fine for a repeat offender, identifiability led to lesser inclina-
tion to raise the sanction. One possible explanation is that the transgressions in the 
scenarios—such as breach of contract to mitigate losses, failing to prevent one’s cow 
from damaging a neighbor’s property, or littering in a public park—were compara-
tively mild and did not involve moral turpitude. (Arguably, the cases involving 
breach of contract to make extra profits or defamation are different in this regard. 
However, the study’s participants may have thought the former to be somewhat un-
derstandable in commercial contexts123 or that the libeler had not acted with mali-
cious intent.)124 This explanation is supported by the fact that in Experiment 1, across 
scenarios, respondents who were cast in the role of decision maker were marginally 
less angry at the injuring party than those responding as policy makers 
(t(407) = 1.928, p = .055). Furthermore, in Experiment 2, across scenarios, the 
wrongdoer evoked greater overall positive emotions among decision makers than 
among policy makers (F(1, 402) = 5.294, p = .022). 
Another possible reason that identification did not result in harsher treatment is 
that the identified wrongdoer in our experiments had not harmed the decision maker. 
In one of the studies documenting an adverse effect of identifiability, the greater 
willingness to penalize was in response to blameworthy behavior toward the re-
spondents themselves.125 Another study, however, had found a similar effect when 
the respondents were not involved or suffered no injury.126 It appears, then, that this 
issue is context-dependent, and more experimentation is necessary to understand the 
correlation between personal injury and the adverse effect of identification. Such 
experiments would be highly relevant for the law. Although legal decision makers—
such as judges—were not personally harmed by the individual whose case they must 
decide, during the judicial process they are exposed to far more detailed information 
about the blameworthiness of that individual than a respondent who is answering a 
questionnaire.127  
Note that the fact that Experiment 1 found an IE benefiting the identified individ-
ual does not mean that respondents were uninfluenced by the fact that this individual 
had infringed upon someone else’s rights. The identifiability effect might have been 
stronger, and the divergence between the judgments of policy makers and decision 
makers more pronounced, had the scenarios involved a more innocuous behavior. In 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. The wrongdoer’s behavior may have been viewed as understandable especially since 
it was stated that the buyer would receive monetary compensation to cover all his losses. 
 124. The defamation event did not state whether the libeler knew that the information he 
was spreading was a lie.  
 125. Small & Loewenstein, supra note 13, at 313–16 (finding that participants who 
behaved uncooperatively in the first stage of a laboratory game later received a higher 
monetary penalty from the cooperative participants if these wrongdoers were identified, rather 
than unidentified).  
 126. Kogut, supra note 12, at 750–51, 754 (showing that an identified AIDS victim who 
contracted the disease as a result of drug abuse received smaller donations toward expensive 
medication than an identical victim who remained unidentified).  
 127. See also infra notes 132–38 and accompanying text. 
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other words, the fact that the vignettes in this study involved an injury to rights may 
have reduced the favorable IE, but not eliminated it entirely.  
A related, noteworthy issue is that Experiment 1 found an identifiability effect in 
favor of the rights infringer, even though the rights holder was also identified in the 
decision-maker scenarios. Does this mean that identifiability has no effect on the 
decision makers’ attitudes toward the injured party, or that the beneficial effect of 
identification for the rights holder is less than that for the rights infringer? On this 
point, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions from this experiment. 
Although both parties were identified by their first name, the vignettes still focused 
respondents’ attention on the remedial burden appropriate for the injuring party. 
Thus, for example, the damages-to-property scenario centered on whether the in-
jurer’s financial situation should affect the damages he pays, and the breach-of-
contract case highlighted his losses or gains. Consequently, it is not surprising if 
identification mainly affected the respondents’ responses toward the rights infringer. 
(Kogut, it should be noted, suggested that identifiability would increase or decrease 
punishment depending on whether the punisher adopts the perspective of the injured 
party or the wrongdoer).128  
The results of Experiment 2 rule out the possibility that the identifiability of the 
injured party was essential to the results of Experiment 1. The fine scenarios em-
ployed in Experiment 2 referred to largely victimless offenses and, in any case, no 
victim—identified or not—was mentioned in the vignettes. In the context of such 
fines, the only identified person is the offender. We found a similar effect of identi-
fiability as in Experiment 1: decision makers, whose judgment pertained to an iden-
tified person, were more lenient toward the wrongdoer than policy makers, whose 
judgment pertained to unidentified people. 
In summary, the present experiments are a preliminary investigation of the IE’s 
relevance for the law in general, and for lawmaking in particular. They demonstrate 
the fruitfulness of testing this understudied psychological phenomenon. Part III sug-
gests initial normative implications.  
III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
Before we discuss the implications of the IE, two caveats are in order. First, when 
shifting from experimental results to normative recommendations, one major con-
cern is external validity. Like many other studies of the IE, our experiments tested it 
with laypeople. One might argue that professionals, such as judges, would be less 
susceptible to the IE. While we concede the need for caution in this regard, prelimi-
nary evidence suggests that experienced professionals are not immune to this effect. 
Thus, for example, Redelmeier and Tversky showed that practicing physicians make 
different medical decisions when evaluating an individual patient than when consid-
ering comparable patients in general.129 Kogut demonstrated a similar difference in 
judgment when school educators considered an issue affecting their school from the 
perspective of an identified student or that of a group of students.130 Although the IE 
                                                                                                                 
 
 128. Kogut, supra note 36, at 1497.  
 129. Redelmeier & Tversky, supra note 32, at 1163.  
 130. Kogut, supra note 82, at 94, 97–99.  
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has yet to be tested with regard to judges and other legal professionals, it is extremely 
unlikely that they are unsusceptible to it. A host of experimental studies have demon-
strated that judges tend to use the same heuristics and display the same cognitive 
biases as other people,131 and a recent study by Wistrich, Rachlinski, and Guthrie—
involving the responses of practicing judges to questionnaires concerning hypothet-
ical legal cases—seems particularly pertinent.132 They found that the judges’ feelings 
about the litigants, as described in the cases, influenced their decisions.133 Specifi-
cally, cases that were similar in all legally relevant respects were decided differently 
depending on the litigant’s likability.134 For example, in a scenario involving an il-
legal immigrant, sympathy or lack of sympathy for the defendant135 affected the 
judges’ ruling on a pure question of law, as well as on the length of the prison sen-
tence: a likable defendant was much more likely to receive a favorable ruling and a 
more lenient sentence than a less likable one.136 Since the explanation for the IE is 
rooted primarily in the stronger emotional reaction elicited by an identified individ-
ual,137 it is reasonable to believe that legal professionals, including judges, would be 
influenced by it as well.138 It should also be noted that our experiments found an 
identifiability effect even in a short questionnaire that provided very little identifying 
information—whereas in real life, such as a courtroom, identification is much more 
detailed, intimate, and prolonged. Plausibly, therefore, it would be just as likely, if 
not more so, to give rise to an identifiability effect.139 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. See generally Doron Teichman & Eyal Zamir, Judicial Decision-Making: A 
Behavioral Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE 
LAW, supra note 5, at  664, 690–92. 
 132. Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do 
Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855 (2015). 
 133. Id. at 862. 
 134. Id. at 898–900. 
 135. The only difference between the scenarios concerned the reason that the illegal 
immigrant entered the United States. Id. at 877–78. One group of judges was told that the 
defendant had been hired by a drug cartel to track down someone who had stolen drugs from 
it, and the second group was informed that the defendant was a father who wanted to earn 
more money to pay for a liver transplant for his daughter. Id. 
 136. Id. at 876–80. Basically similar results were obtained in questionnaires involving 
issues such as possession of medical marijuana, a constitutional challenge to strip-searching, 
credit card debt, and environmental pollution. In all these cases, judges were more likely to 
interpret and apply the law in favor of the more sympathetic litigant than in favor of the less 
sympathetic one. Id. at 898–900; see also Teichman & Zamir, supra note 131, at 690–91 
(summarizing the literature showing that judges are also susceptible to various cognitive 
biases).  
 137. See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text.  
 138. For a short survey of the literature on decision making by professionals, see ZAMIR, 
supra note 6, at 33–36; see also Paul Brest, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Debiasing the 
Policy Makers Themselves (assuming that professional policy makers are also prone to various 
decision-making biases, and suggesting strategies to mitigate them), in THE BEHAVIORAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 44, at 481.  
 139. Cf. Vicki L. Fishfader, Gary N. Howells, Roger C. Katz & Pamela S. Teresi, 
Evidential and Extralegal Factors in Juror Decisions: Presentation Mode, Retention, and 
Level of Emotionality, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 565, 568–70 (1996) (finding that subjects who 
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Second, the normative debates discussed below involve complex, sometimes con-
flicting, considerations. This Article highlights the relevance of the IE to these de-
bates. We do not argue that considerations based on the IE should necessarily trump 
other considerations—but rather, that the possibility of an identifiability effect 
should be recognized and taken into account, along with other relevant factors. The 
actual weight assigned to this phenomenon should vary with the relevant context and 
circumstances.  
A. Debiasing the Identifiability Effect? 
A normative issue that commonly arises with respect to behavioral phenomena is 
whether the law should attempt to debias individuals and steer them toward a more 
rational path.140 One might, for example, accept that people are inclined to react dif-
ferently toward identified and unidentified others but insist that this tendency be 
counteracted—that is, that measures be taken to ensure that people respond in a simi-
lar fashion to identified and unidentified individuals. In that regard, two questions 
should be addressed: Is the IE an irrational and undesirable bias? and can the IE be 
debiased (at a reasonable cost and without significant negative side effects)?  
Many scholars believe that the IE is irrational,141 but this matter is quite complex. 
It would be useful to differentiate between people’s reactions toward statistical ver-
sus nonstatistical individuals, and their reactions to anonymous versus non-
anonymous individuals. We address each of these distinctions in turn.  
On the face of it, it seems irrational to spend far greater resources on saving, for 
example, a few miners trapped in a mine shaft (nonstatistical victims) than on safety 
measures that would prevent mining accidents in the first place, thereby plausibly 
saving more lives in the long run (statistical victims).142 Philosophers, however, have 
offered justifications for people’s greater concern for nonstatistical lives. For exam-
ple, it was argued that rational persons may seek to reduce not only the total number 
of deaths in society but also the despair and dread that accompanies the awareness 
of being in grave peril of death, which occurs only in the nonstatistical case.143 From 
                                                                                                                 
 
watched a video of a trial experienced stronger emotional reactions than subjects who had only 
read the transcripts). 
 140. For discussions of debiasing through law, see generally Jeremy A. Blumenthal, 
Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006).  
 141. E.g., Kogut & Ritov, supra note 26, at 114 ( “[I]t is unlikely that social benefits will 
be maximized when resources are made available to identified victims more than to 
unidentified ones.”); Small et al., supra note 2, at 143–44 (acknowledging the possibility that 
excessive resources are expended on identified victims at the expense of statistical ones); 
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 80, at 723 (noting that paying less attention to statistical 
deaths is a “cognitive failure”); see also James K. Hammitt & Nicolas Treich, Statistical vs. 
Identified Lives in Benefit-Cost Analysis, 35 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 45, 62, 64 (2007) (stating 
that a systematic premium for identified lives is not supported by cost-benefit analysis and 
cost-effectiveness analysis); John McKie & Jeff Richardson, The Rule of Rescue, 56 SOC. SCI. 
& MED. 2407, 2408 (2003) (arguing that conventional cost-benefit analysis is impersonal and 
does not favor identifiable persons over unidentifiable ones).  
 142. Charles Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1416–17 (1969).  
 143. Id. at 1433–37; Mark Kelman, Saving Lives, Saving from Death, Saving from Dying: 
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the standpoint of standard economic analysis, welfare is maximized by the satisfac-
tion of individuals’ actual preferences, whatever they may be—thus, catering to peo-
ple’s greater concerns about identified victims appears to be justified.144 But even 
under ideal-preferences theories, which discount at least some objectionable or ir-
rational preferences,145 there seems to be no compelling reason to ignore or try to 
change preferences for allocating significant resources to minimize certain types of 
death, for example.146 This argument is not limited to matters of life and death but 
extends to other allocation trade-offs between statistical and nonstatistical individu-
als, as well. For the purposes of this Article, however, we need not take a stand on 
this issue. Suffice it to say that the greater compassion exhibited toward nonstatistical 
persons is not necessarily irrational. 
In contrast, the different reaction toward anonymous and nonanonymous individ-
uals does appear to be irrational, since in both cases we are dealing with actual, non-
statistical individuals. Identifying information such as a name or a number does not 
provide a good reason for favoring or disfavoring the identified person.147 However, 
it should be noted that the problem may lie not with the stronger reaction to identifi-
able individuals per se, but in the disparate attitude toward, or treatment of, anony-
mous and nonanonymous individuals. That is to say, it may not always be clear 
which of these two reactions is “correct.” Take, for example, instances where greater 
donations are given to an identified person than to an anonymous person; one could 
view this as meaning that the donations to the identified individual are excessive 
—but equally possible is that the interests of the anonymous recipient are being 
unduly discounted and that minimal identification corrects this bias.148 The same 
                                                                                                                 
 
Reflection on ‘Over-Valuing’ Identifiable Victims, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y. L. & ETHICS 51, 
58, 74–88 (2011); see also RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 277–80 (2011) 
(arguing, based on the value of human dignity, that there is a stronger moral duty to rescue a 
stranger if he or she is identifiable, rather than statistical and anonymous, and his or her need 
is local and immediate, rather than physically distant or in the future). For criticism of various 
justifications for favoring nonstatistical, identified lives, see McKie & Richardson, supra note 
141, at 2413–17; Kenneth W. Simons, Dworkin’s Two Principles of Dignity: An 
Unsatisfactory Nonconsequentialist Account of Interpersonal Moral Duties, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
715, 718, 721–24 (2010). For discussion of philosophical arguments in favor—as well as 
against—prioritizing identified over statistical victims, see IDENTIFIED VERSUS STATISTICAL 
LIVES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 43–157. 
 144. See JOHN BROOME, ETHICS OUT OF ECONOMICS 3–4 (1999); JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-
BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 10 (1986).  
 145. According to an ideal-preferences theory, a person’s well-being is enhanced to the 
extent that her ideal preferences—those she would have had if she thoroughly, clearly, and 
calmly considered all possible alternatives and their consequences with full information and 
no errors in reasoning—are fulfilled. SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 38 (1998).  
 146. See McKie & Richardson, supra note 141, at 2411–12 (acknowledging that if 
individuals derive utility from knowing that they live in a compassionate society who rescues 
those in desperate need, then this utility should be taken into account).  
 147. As explained above, identification can be either beneficial or detrimental for the identified 
person, depending on the circumstances. See supra notes 24–37 and accompanying text.  
 148. Cf. Small et al., supra note 2, at 144 (observing, in the context of donations to chari-
table causes, that it cannot be generally stated that “‘the identifiable victim effect’ is a bias to 
give too much to identifiable victims or to give too little to statistical victims”; instead, “[t]he 
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may be said about the singularity effect: although it seems irrational to donate more 
money to a single identified individual than to a group of identified people,149 this 
discrepancy may be due either to a disproportionate response toward single 
beneficiaries or to an inadequate psychological processing of groups.150 Thus, the 
desirability of debiasing is closely related to the particular context: one must first 
decide whether identification is likely to cause an overvaluation or correct an 
undervaluation, and only in the former case is debiasing of the IE plausibly justified. 
Can the IE be successfully debiased? Even if one assumes that the IE is irrational 
or inefficient, it is possible that the strong emotional response toward identified per-
sons cannot be curbed, or that the weaker response toward unidentified persons and 
groups (both identified and unidentified) cannot be strengthened. In real life, situa-
tions involving either identified or unidentified individuals are usually encountered 
separately. When faced with one type of decision, people do not consider the other. 
The well-known, lamentable inaction of governments and individuals to atrocities 
perpetrated across the globe demonstrates the gap between people’s reaction to the 
plights of identified individuals and groups of unidentified people.151  
Experimental attempts to debias the IE and the singularity effect have not yielded 
encouraging results. Kogut and Ritov succeeded in eliminating the significant differ-
ence between the actual sums of money donated, separately, to a single identified 
recipient and to an identified group152 by presenting respondents with both cases 
simultaneously and giving them a chance to evaluate the cases on a comparative 
basis. Respondents in the joint evaluation conditions were either allowed to donate 
to both the individual and the group or were asked to choose between the two.153 In 
the former case, most people contributed similar sums to the single person and the 
group; in the latter, most preferred to contribute to the group  (i.e., to help more 
                                                                                                                 
 
bias is simply that people care inconsistently” (emphasis in original)); see also Till 
Bӓrnighausen & Max Essex, From Biology to Policy: Ethical and Economic Issues in HIV 
Treatment-as-Prevention (suggesting the possibility that the identifiability of the people cur-
rently suffering from AIDS has led to a normatively correct level of investment in treatment, 
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victims), in IDENTIFIED VERSUS STATISTICAL LIVES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE, 
supra note 1, at 203, 209. 
 149. See supra notes 38–46 and accompanying text. 
 150. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 892–93 
(2006). Schauer points out a virtue of lawmaking by the courts: it is done with respect to a live 
controversy, and therefore enables the lawmaker to see the real world implications of various 
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 151. Slovic et al., supra note 44, at 126.  
 152. Kogut & Ritov, supra note 26, at 109–10, 112 (finding that the mean contribution for 
a single identified sick child was significantly higher than the mean contribution for a group 
of identified children).  
 153. Id. at 111. 
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people).154 Notably, however, the overall donation to the single person and the group 
in each type of joint evaluation was less than the donations to the single identified 
recipient in the separate evaluation.155 In other words, the debiasing mechanism 
achieved greater equality (and perhaps also more rationality) only at the price of 
considerably reducing the overall size of the donations “pie.” 
Similarly, Small and her colleagues examined contributions to alleviate starvation 
in Africa and compared donations to a single identified child versus anonymous chil-
dren.156 They attempted to debias the significant observed IE either by explicitly 
educating potential donators about this psychological phenomenon or by providing 
them with statistics about the extent of starvation in Africa, alongside a request for 
donation for an identifiable victim.157 Both techniques succeeded only in reducing 
the sum contributed to the single identified victim, bringing it down to the level of 
donations for the anonymous, numerous victims.158 The two debiasing techniques 
undermined feelings of sympathy and compassion toward the identified recipient 
without kindling such emotions toward unidentified recipients. As a result, overall 
generosity was reduced.159  
In summary, psychological studies suggest that, even in the laboratory, debiasing 
the IE is not a viable option. Debiasing the IE in the real world is likely even more 
difficult, if possible at all. Furthermore, where debiasing is both justifiable and 
achievable, it can probably be carried out only in one direction—that of “leveling 
down.”160 Such debiasing is desirable only if one is confident that identification 
would lead to an excessive (positive or negative) reaction toward the identified per-
son. Obviously, this was not the case in the donation studies mentioned above. The 
limited desirability and/or possibility of debiasing should be a factor in our policy 
recommendations. In this section, we offer some general observations; in the follow-
ing sections we will address more specific applications. 
When contemplating how to take the IE into account in policy or decision making, 
two main strategies come to mind. One is to harness the IE to achieve desirable ends. 
This strategy is appropriate when we are fairly certain that in the unidentified state, 
a relevant interest, consideration, or goal is undervalued. In such situations, deliber-
ate identification aims to correct what would otherwise be a suboptimal outcome. 
Charitable organizations commonly employ this approach, by featuring a single vic-
tim on their posters, or by offering donors the possibility of earmarking their 
contribution for a specific beneficiary or even being in touch with him or her through 
                                                                                                                 
 
 154. Id. at 112.  
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 156. Small et al., supra note 2, at 145–46. 
 157. Id. at 145–46, 148.  
 158. Id. at 146, 149. 
 159. Id. at 150–51.  
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correspondence or some other means.161 The law, too, perhaps, can utilize this 
strategy to achieve desirable social outcomes, such as promoting equality or 
enhancing public support for redistributive measures.162  
The question as to whether it is legitimate for the state to harness psychological 
phenomena to achieve desirable social goals is beyond the scope of this study. While 
some scholars favor the use of cognitive insights to enhance people’s welfare,163 oth-
ers see it as excessively paternalistic or manipulative.164 However, even the latter 
scholars concede that transparency by the state about its use of such phenomena can 
alleviate the problem of manipulation.165  
A second way to deal with the IE is to adopt the types of rules and remedies that 
are less prone to the effect. This strategy is suitable whenever identification of the 
relevant parties is unavoidable and likely to lead to overvaluation of an interest or 
consideration, or when it is difficult to estimate the impact of the IE in advance. If 
we lack sufficient knowledge in this regard, it may be wise to bypass potentially 
problematic situations altogether. In this way, the law can minimize the non-
egalitarian effects of identification. As explained below (and all else being equal), 
opting for rules instead of standards may reduce these downsides of the IE.166  
                                                                                                                 
 
 161. For an artistic demonstration of this technique, see Jack Nicholson’s memorable 
performance in the film ABOUT SCHMIDT (New Line Cinema 2002). Nicholson portrays a man 
who, after retirement and the death of his wife, finds new meaning in life through sponsoring 
an African boy named Ndugu. Id. 
 162. See infra Part III.C.  
 163. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161–62, 1172–73, 1175–77 (2003). Sunstein and Thaler 
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Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCIENCE 1338 (2003).  
 164. E.g., Daniel M. Hausman & Brynn Welch, Debate: To Nudge or Not To Nudge, 18 J. 
POL. PHIL. 123, 128–32 (2010) (arguing that exploitation of imperfections in human judgment 
and decision making undermines people’s control over their evaluations and choices and is 
therefore injurious to their autonomy); see also Luc Bovens, The Ethics of Nudge (comparing 
such use of cognitive biases to subliminal advertising on TV), in PREFERENCE CHANGE: 
APPROACHES FROM PHILOSOPHY, ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 207, 216–17 (Till Grüne-
Yanoff & Sven Ove Hansson eds., 2009). 
 165. Bovens, supra note 164, at 217; Hausman & Welch, supra note 164, at 135.  
 166. See infra notes 183–93 and accompanying text.  
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B. Policy Making Versus Decision Making, and Rules Versus Standards 
Our experimental results directly point to one major implication of the IE for 
lawmaking: because of the IE, the outcomes of general policy making and decision 
making in particular cases may differ, even when they pertain to similar situations.167 
Policy makers typically deal with unidentified individuals, while decision makers 
interact with identified ones. Consequently, depending on the circumstances, the 
judgments made by decision makers may be either more or less favorable to the 
identified individual. Although jurists have acknowledged that adjudication and leg-
islation can produce different answers to similar legal questions, they have attributed 
this to other causes, such as differences in political pressures, goals, or jurisdictional 
authority between legislators and courts.168 However, awareness of the IE is im-
portant for reasons beyond the introduction of a new source of divergence. It implies 
that even if all other differences were eliminated, the presence of even minimal iden-
tification—including one that conveys no meaningful information—would likely af-
fect the legal outcome, at least in some cases. Identifiability in adjudication and other 
concrete decisions, and nonidentifiability in legislation, are largely unavoidable fea-
tures of these two processes.  
Policy makers should be cognizant of the potential influence of the IE. Assuming 
that they establish legal norms with a certain outcome in mind, they should be aware 
of the fact that, because of the IE, the application of their rules, regulations, or guide-
lines may result in a more lenient or more severe outcome than they intend. When it 
is possible to foresee whether a subsequent decision-making outcome would be ei-
ther milder or harsher, policy makers can take measures in advance to counteract the 
effect. For instance, if decision makers are usually more lenient than policy makers 
would like them to be in a certain context, the policy could set a stricter legal norm.169 
However, such generalizations are not always possible. The actual (beneficial or det-
rimental) effect of identification may depend on the circumstances of the particular 
case and the characteristics of the specific parties involved.170 This means not only 
that the outcome intended by policy makers might not be realized in practice but also 
that similar cases may not be treated alike. Although the possibility of inconsistency 
or unequal treatment is a recognized disadvantage of case-by-case decision making, 
the IE appears to exacerbate this problem. Thus, scholars have argued that the case-
by-case approach might cause lawmakers to excessively focus on the personalities 
and unique features of the parties to the dispute, at the expense of general, systematic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 167. Cf. Redelmeier & Tversky, supra note 32, at 1164 (observing that the discrepancy 
between medical decisions with regard to an individual patient and patients as a group can 
cause tensions between health policy makers and practitioners, even when the relevant facts 
are accepted by both).  
 168. E.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 933, 934–35 (2006).  
 169. At the same time, policy makers should also take into account the expressive message 
conveyed by a harsher legal norm. For example, it would be unreasonable to significantly 
increase a legal sanction just to counteract the effect of identifiability on decision makers.  
 170. See Kogut, supra note 36, at 1497–98 (demonstrating that identifiability may either 
increase or decrease willingness to punish, depending on whether the punisher adopts the 
perspective of the injuring or injured party). 
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variables.171 The IE, however, indicates that even if decision makers do not focus 
unduly on individuating variations, the very fact that they are dealing with identified 
people can lead them in different directions. One possible response—if not solu-
tion—to this problem is to adopt legal mechanisms that mitigate the undesirable ef-
fects of identifiability. This leads us to the rules versus standards debate.  
Legal norms are conventionally classified as belonging to one of two forms: rules 
or standards.172 Rules determine the required conduct in advance, based on well-
specified, easily ascertainable facts. A typical example is setting the speed limit to 
fifty-five miles per hour.173 Rules aim to curtail the discretion of decision makers by 
confining them largely to questions of fact.174 Standards, in contrast, are more open-
ended and abstract: they provide a general description of the required conduct, based 
on substantive objectives and values. In the context of speed limits, for instance, a 
standard might state that drivers travel “no faster than is reasonable.”175 Thus, a 
standard entails an evaluation of the circumstances of the case in light of the value 
embodied therein, and affords decision makers broader discretion as to whether a 
person in a particular instance abided by the legal norm.176  
There is a vast legal literature on the choice between rules and standards and their 
relative costs and benefits.177 A detailed discussion of this issue exceeds the scope of 
this Article—however, in a nutshell, rules are regarded as having the advantage of 
clarity and certainty in guiding behavior178 but can turn out to be either under- or 
overinclusive.179 In addition, formulating precise and detailed rules is costly.180 Con-
versely, standards lack the same degree of clarity or predictability but are relatively 
cheap to craft and less prone to under- or overinclusiveness.181 At the same time, 
taking all the relevant factors into account on a case-by-case basis is also costly and 
can result in decision-making errors or misuse.182 Thus, the choice between rules and 
standards requires a tradeoff between these various advantages and shortcomings. 
Generally speaking, it is argued that rules may be preferable to standards when the 
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regulated conduct is recurrent and relatively homogeneous (such as driving a car) 
and vice versa when the relevant conduct does not form a recurrent pattern or is 
infrequent.183 
Without attempting to delineate the correct division of labor between rules and 
standards, our findings add another important consideration to the debate. The ex-
periment indicates that legal decision makers may be susceptible to the IE. Identifi-
cation is largely unavoidable in many decision-making situations, such as adjudica-
tion. However, rules have an advantage over standards in this regard, as they can 
reduce the potential adverse effect of identifiability. Since rules are formulated with 
relative precision when the people to whom they will apply are still unidentified, 
there can be no favorable or unfavorable effect of identification. In the implementa-
tion stage, rules typically leave less discretion than standards do. The more limited 
the discretion of decision makers, the narrower would be the possible divergence in 
the treatment of similar cases, depending on whether identification proves to be bene-
ficial or detrimental to the identified person.  
True, in reality, the dividing line between rules and standards is not always clear-
cut, and the differences between these two forms of legal commands should not be 
overstated. On the one hand, rules can greatly vary in their level of specificity: while 
some rules are simple and their application involves mainly fact-finding and little 
discretion, others may include distinctions, provisos and exceptions and entail com-
plex questions of interpretation and law.184 In addition, it is not always clear which 
rule, among several, should apply to any given set of facts.185 Consequently, even 
with rules, decision makers sometimes enjoy considerable discretion.186 On the other 
hand, the broad discretion afforded by standards is indirectly constrained in various 
ways. Factors such as the presence of advocates for both parties to the conflict, rules 
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of evidence,187 stare decisis,188 the need to justify decisions in writing, and the right 
of appeal189 all contribute to mitigating inequality and unpredictability under 
standards.190 
Nonetheless, it is generally true that on the continuum between no discretion and 
unfettered discretion, standards are frequently vaguer and leave more room for dis-
cretion than rules.191 Furthermore, the perceptions of decision makers about the 
scope of their discretion may also be a factor. Even assuming that similar discretion 
can theoretically be exercised under a system of rules and a system of standards, 
rules may be perceived by decision makers as precluding or restricting implementa-
tion of their value judgments, while standards may be regarded as permitting or le-
gitimizing such implementation.192 Thus, standards such as “reasonableness,” “un-
conscionability,” “fairness,” or “good faith” may encourage decision makers to 
exercise their discretion more freely, thereby increasing the risk of unequal treatment 
due to the IE.  
In summary, when choosing between rules and standards, the IE should be taken 
into account.193 To the extent that open-ended standards afford more discretion to 
decision makers than rules do, the IE points to another advantage of rules over 
standards. 
C. Redistribution Through Taxes Versus Private Law 
Another important implication of the IE for lawmaking applies to the re-
distribution of welfare by the state. Many people would agree that promoting equal-
ity in society is an important governmental goal. Much more controversial, however, 
is the question as to what means should be used to redistribute welfare. Specifically, 
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an ongoing legal debate has centered on whether redistribution should be accom-
plished solely through taxes and transfer payments (such as progressive taxation, 
negative taxes, unemployment compensation, and cash assistance to needy families) 
or through private law, as well. The latter includes substantive rules of property, tort, 
and contract law, such as mandatory quality standards in favor of tenants (here-
inafter, legal rules).194  
Law-and-economics scholars have argued that legal rules should not be used for 
redistribution because they are costlier and less effective than the tax-and-transfer 
alternative.195 When legal rules redistribute income in favor of the poor, so the argu-
ment goes, they distort people’s incentives to work just as much as the tax system. 
People would respond to a redistributive legal rule much as they would to an increase 
in their marginal tax rates, and may consequently choose leisure over labor. Legal 
rules, however, create an additional inefficiency—a distortion in the very behavior 
that the legal rules aim to regulate. For example, a thirty percent marginal tax rate 
together with an inefficient tort rule that redistributes one percent of wealthy defend-
ants’ income to poor plaintiffs would distort work incentives to the same extent as a 
thirty-one percent tax rate coupled with an efficient tort rule. The former regime, 
however, entails the additional costs involved in defendants taking excessive precau-
tions and refraining from efficient activities.196 In addition, it has been argued that 
legal rules are less effective than taxes and transfers, in that they achieve less of the 
desired distributive outcomes. This is because in contractual settings (as opposed to 
circumstances in which bargaining is impractical) the market often responds in a way 
that wholly or partially offsets the redistribution.197 Take, for example, a mandatory 
quality standard in favor of tenants, requiring landlords to rent out residential units 
that are fit for human habitation.198 Increasing landlords’ costs is liable to increase 
rents and reduce the supply of low-rent housing, thereby harming the poorest 
tenants.199 
Elsewhere, one of us has argued that behavioral studies strengthen the case for 
redistribution through legal rules as well.200 The conventional law-and-economics 
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argument assumes that the success of the redistribution should be evaluated accord-
ing to the bare quantity of resources that people receive, regardless of how they were 
obtained. However, many experiments have shown that the benefit people derive 
from resources is dependent on complex factors, including the acts that generated 
the resources and the sources from which they are received. Thus, for example, an 
object attained “as of right,” through effort, or as a result of success, is valued much 
more highly than a similar object obtained through no entitlement, through chance, 
or due to failure.201 In legal contexts, it has been found that factors such as how an 
outcome came about (e.g., through goodwill and cooperation or not), the identity of 
the parties involved (e.g., strangers or friends), the voluntariness or nonvoluntariness 
of their behavior, and the intentionality or nonintentionality of their acts significantly 
affect its valuation by laypersons and businesspeople alike.202 
This body of research indicates that some methods of redistribution are likely to 
be perceived as humiliating, while others are likely to be regarded as more respectful 
and empowering. Taxes and transfer payments are often viewed as “charity giv-
ing,”203 whereas redistributive legal rules set the baseline for interactions between 
individuals and typically convey a message of entitlement.204 Consequently, a 
smaller quantity of goods obtained through legal rules may advance the recipients’ 
welfare to a greater extent than the same or even larger amount received through 
taxes and transfer payments. The implied warranty of habitability in landlord and 
tenant law, for instance, carries with it a message that the object of a lease can only 
be a house fit for human habitation. Accordingly, tenants have a right to habitable 
housing. This rule applies to all tenants, not only to poor ones, and thus does not 
carry with it a banner of “help for the needy.” Furthermore, redistribution that is 
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perceived as the recipients’ entitlement is likely to encounter less resistance from 
nonrecipients than one that is viewed as a handout.205  
The IE phenomenon lends support to these arguments. It points to another ad-
vantage of redistributive legal rules over taxes and transfer payments. Private law 
rules set the baseline for fair dealing, cooperation, and real-life interactions between 
nonanonymous, identified individuals: a landlord and her tenant, an employer and 
her employee, spouses, and so forth. As we have seen, identifiability increases peo-
ple’s generosity toward others and their willingness to help them.206 Identification 
can be expected to cause a beneficial effect in this context, rather than a detrimental 
one, because legal rules cultivate notions of entitlement and are therefore not likely 
to be associated with blameworthy behavior on the part of the recipients.207 More-
over, experimental studies show that identifiability is particularly beneficial in situ-
ations that are perceived to involve intergroup conflict. In such cases, the IE enhances 
the generosity toward an individual from the opposing group.208 To the extent that 
the parties to a tenancy, employment, or consumer relationship regard themselves as 
belonging to rival groups with conflicting interests, identification has the propensity 
to increase feelings of sympathy and relatedness to the other party. Thus, the IE sug-
gests that redistributive legal rules are likely to be more successful than commonly 
believed. By deploying such rules, the state can harness the IE to promote prosocial 
behavior and enhance the public’s support for redistributive measures.  
In contrast to legal rules, taxes and transfer payments lack identifiability 
—namely, they do not address day-to-day interactions between identified persons. 
People interact with the government, which functions as a taker or a bestower of 
money, rather than among themselves. Thus, the “link” between the individual givers 
and recipients of the redistribution is severed, and the recipients remain anonymous. 
No notions of entitlement in mutual relationships can be formed, and no patterns of 
cooperation, fair dealing, or commitment can emerge.209 In such circumstances, it is 
reasonable to assume that the transferors would feel not only less sympathy toward 
the unidentified recipients but also less responsibility or confidence that they can 
effectively help them. As previously explained, people’s empathy and generosity to-
ward others decline when those in need are unidentified210 and when perceptions of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 205. For further elaboration, see Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 200, at 362–72, 380–89. 
Note that even if the implied warranty of habitability fails to redistribute income—because the 
market responds by raising the rents or altering other terms in the lease—it may still succeed 
in redistributing the objective good of minimal quality housing. Id. at 340–51. Furthermore, 
some writers argue that in certain circumstances, the implied warranty of habitability would 
successfully transfer wealth to tenants. Ackerman, supra note 194, at 1097–98, 1102–19, 
1186–88; Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income 
Housing: “Milking” and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 485, 497–506 (1987). 
 206. See supra notes 24–33 and accompanying text. Even if a certain landlord, for 
example, has several tenants (rather than just one), there is still a one-on-one contractual 
relationship with each tangible and identified tenant.  
 207. On the connection between perceptions of fault and adverse effect of identifiability, 
see supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text.  
 208. See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text.  
 209. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 200, at 360. 
 210. See supra notes 24–33, 64–66 and accompanying text. 
546 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:505 
 
personal responsibility or effectiveness are weak.211 It is not surprising, therefore, 
that taxes and transfer payments are often perceived, by nonrecipients and recipients 
alike, as a form of charity—other people’s money being transferred to possibly un-
deserving beneficiaries.212 Thus, income transfers—the method of redistribution 
recommended by standard economic analysis—encounter the greatest resistance.213 
To the extent that these perceptions and reactions are widely entrenched and unlikely 
to change,214 we must take them into account when contemplating the optimal way 
to redistribute. For one thing, it would be difficult to sustain welfare programs over 
time in the face of unsympathetic public opinion.215 
Is it possible to change this state of affairs and increase public support by identi-
fying the recipients of taxes and transfer payments? Alas, probably not. In almost all 
studies of the IE, subjects were able to help a particular individual—that is, the re-
cipient was the identified individual herself, and not a representative of recipients in 
general or a member of some recipient group.216 To the best of our knowledge, only 
one study observed an identifiability effect in the latter case.217 Furthermore, studies 
of the IE show that, at least in some circumstances, this phenomenon is largely lim-
ited to single individuals and does not extend to groups.218 Another relevant consid-
eration is whether identifying a recipient might backfire and actually weaken public 
support for the redistributive measure. This can occur if the beneficiaries of taxes 
and transfer payments are regarded as “undeserving poor,”219 since identification 
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may be detrimental when the identified individual can be blamed for his or her con-
dition.220 That said, it is possible that this risk does not exist with respect to welfare 
payments that typically are not associated with fault—such as those aiding the very 
young, the old, or the handicapped.221  
For all these reasons, it is doubtful that identifying a particular recipient of welfare 
payments by photo and name, for example, would suffice to enhance public support 
for such monetary transfers. It would hardly be credible for the state to claim that 
funds raised from certain taxpayers are earmarked for a particular individual’s needs, 
in the manner that charities enable donors to assign their contribution to a specific 
beneficiary and class actions feature a representative individual claimant who sues 
on behalf of herself and a larger group.222 It would likely also be prohibitively costly 
to actually implement such a scheme in the context of taxation and other monetary 
welfare transfers.223  
In summary, while identifiability is a natural, inherent feature of redistribution 
through legal rules and may contribute to their success, it is lacking in the context of 
taxes and transfer payments. We do not claim that redistributive legal rules should 
substitute tax-and-transfer arrangements: there may be various factors militating in 
favor of or against any given mode of redistribution.224 However, the IE lends addi-
tional support to the argument that legal rules are an important and unique re-
distributive tool that should be allowed to complement taxes and transfer payments. 
In addition, it would be worthwhile to examine whether identification of beneficiar-
ies can, in practice, improve the low level of public support for the tax-and-transfer 
method of redistribution.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article highlighted the importance of a powerful, yet largely overlooked 
phenomenon—the identifiability effect—for the law. It relied on theoretical discus-
sion and the results of original experiments to argue that the IE should be taken into 
account in lawmaking, alongside other relevant factors. The psychological data sug-
gests that the very existence of even minimal identification can affect legal outcomes. 
Depending on the circumstances and the context, identifiability can lead either to 
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more lenient and considerate treatment of the identified person or to harsher and less 
considerate treatment. As a result, the decisions of policy makers and decision mak-
ers may differ substantially, even when pertaining to comparable facts and situations. 
In addition, those affected by the legal rules may react differently, depending on 
whether these rules involve interaction with identified persons or not.  
The different reaction toward identified and unidentified people is advantageous 
in some situations and disadvantageous in others. When identification is likely to 
result in overvaluation of a certain interest, or unjustified differential treatment of 
similar cases, lawmakers should take measures to mitigate its impact. Conversely, 
when a particular interest is typically undervalued, the IE may be harnessed to correct 
this state of affairs to achieve a desirable social goal. This Article has offered some 
initial implications of the IE for lawmaking. Further studies are necessary to fully 
explore the potential of this cognitive phenomenon in the legal sphere. 
*  *  * 
The text of the vignettes used in our experiments is given below, after translation by 
the authors from Hebrew to English. 
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APPENDIX A 
Scenario 1: Cow 
Unidentified/Policy-Making Version 
Imagine that you have to lay down the rules that would apply in cases in 
which livestock, such as a cow, enters neighboring land, causing damage to the 
neighbor’s crops. Generally, the animal’s owner is liable to compensate for the 
damage it has caused, even if he was not negligent in minding it. However, when 
determining the sum of compensation, one can take into account various factors 
that would reduce the amount of damages to be paid.  
You have to establish guidelines on whether to take into account the animal 
owner’s financial situation and reduce the damages award because he is poor. 
Please choose one of the following options: 
1. The damages award should not be reduced at all in view of the animal owner’s 
financial constraints, irrespective of the compensation he is required to pay.  
2. The damages award should be reduced in view of the animal owner’s financial 
constraints only if the compensation that he is required to pay is very high.  
3. The damages award should be reduced in view of the animal owner’s finan-
cial constraints if the compensation that he is required to pay is quite high.  
4. The damages award should be reduced in view of the animal owner’s financial 
constraints, even if the compensation that he is required to pay is quite low.  
5. The damages award should be reduced in any case in view of the animal 
owner’s financial constraints. 
Identified/Decision-Making Version 
Imagine that you have to determine the sum of compensation to be paid in a 
case in which a cow belonging to Abraham entered the land of his neighbor 
Jacob, causing damage to Jacob’s crops. Generally, the animal’s owner is liable 
to compensate for the damage it has caused, even if he was not negligent in 
minding it. However, when determining the sum of compensation, one can take 
into account various factors that would reduce the amount of damages to be paid.  
You have to decide whether to take into account Abraham’s financial 
situation and reduce the damages award because he is poor. Please choose one 
of the following options: 
1. I would not reduce the damages award at all in view of Abraham’s financial 
constraints, irrespective of the compensation he is required to pay.  
2. I would reduce the damages award in view of Abraham’s financial constraints 
only if the compensation that he is required to pay is very high.  
3. I would reduce the damages award in view of Abraham’s financial constraints 
if the compensation that he is required to pay is quite high.  
4. I would reduce the damages award in view of Abraham’s financial con-
straints, even if the compensation that he is required to pay is quite low.  
5. I would reduce the damages award in any case in view of Abraham’s financial 
constraints. 
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Scenario 2: Land 
Unidentified/Policy-Making Version 
Imagine that you have to lay down the rules that would apply in cases in 
which people unintentionally and in good faith build a building on land not 
belonging to them, without the permission of the land’s owner. In such cases, the 
landowner may be awarded one of two remedies. One possibility is to grant an 
order to demolish the unlawful building and return the land to its former state. 
Another possibility is to allow the building to remain and order the builder to pay 
compensation to the landowner.  
You have to establish guidelines on whether to grant a demolition order or a 
compensation order in cases in which a building was mistakenly built on another 
person’s land. Please choose one of the following options: 
1. A demolition order should be issued against the builder, irrespective of the 
value of the building.  
2. A demolition order should not be issued against the builder, but a compensa-
tion order, if the building is worth more than the land on which it was built.  
3. A demolition order should not be issued against the builder, but a compensa-
tion order, if the value of the building is roughly equivalent to the value of 
the land on which it was built.  
4. A demolition order should not be issued against the builder, but a compensa-
tion order, even if the value of the building is lower than the value of the land 
on which it was built.  
5. A demolition order should not be issued against the builder, but a compensa-
tion order, irrespective of the value of the building.  
Identified/Decision-Making Version 
Imagine that you have to determine the remedy that would be given in a case 
in which Isaac unintentionally and in good faith built a building on land not 
belonging to him, without the permission of David, the landowner. David may 
be awarded one of two remedies. One possibility is to grant an order to demolish 
the unlawful building and return the land to its former state. Another possibility 
is to allow the building to remain and order Isaac to pay compensation to David. 
You have to decide whether to grant a demolition order or a compensation 
order, for the building that Isaac mistakenly built on David’s land. Please choose 
one of the following options: 
1. I would issue a demolition order against Isaac, irrespective of the value of the 
building.  
2. I would not issue a demolition order against Isaac, but a compensation order, 
if the building is worth more than the land on which it was built.  
3. I would not issue a demolition order against Isaac, but a compensation order, 
if the value of the building is roughly equivalent to the value of the land on 
which it was built.  
4. I would not issue a demolition order against Isaac, but a compensation order, 
even if the value of the building is lower than the value of the land on which 
it was built.  
5. I would not issue a demolition order against Isaac, but a compensation order, 
irrespective of the value of the building.  
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Scenario 3: Iron-Loss 
Unidentified/Policy-Making Version 
Imagine that you have to lay down the rules that would apply in cases in 
which sellers breach a contract to sell an asset, such as iron products, to buyers. 
Sometimes, after the formation of a contract with a certain buyer, the seller 
realizes that the costs of production are higher than he expected and that he would 
lose money if he performs the contract. The seller may then decide to breach the 
contract with the buyer and not supply the iron. In such cases, the buyer may be 
awarded one of two remedies. One possibility is to grant specific performance—
that is, to order the seller to supply the iron to the buyer. Another possibility is 
to require the seller to pay the buyer monetary damages for all the losses the 
buyer incurred due to nondelivery of the iron on time, including the in-
convenience of purchasing substitute iron from another supplier and the increase 
(in the event that there is one) in the market price of iron. 
You have to establish guidelines on whether to grant specific performance or 
monetary damages in such cases. Please choose one of the following options: 
1. An order for specific performance of the contract with the buyer should be 
issued, irrespective of the magnitude of the seller’s expected loss from per-
forming the contract. 
2. An order for specific performance of the contract with the buyer should be 
issued, even if the seller’s expected loss from performing the contract is high.  
3. An order for specific performance of the contract with the buyer should not 
be issued if the seller’s expected loss from performing the contract is high.  
4. An order for specific performance of the contract with the buyer should not be 
issued, even if the seller’s expected loss from performing the contract is low.  
5. An order for specific performance of the contract with the buyer should not 
be issued in any case but rather an order for monetary damages.  
Identified/Decision-Making Version 
Imagine that you have to determine the remedy that would be given in a case 
in which Michael breached a contract to sell iron products to Ethan. After the 
formation of the contract with Ethan, Michael realized that the costs of 
production are higher than he expected and that he would lose money if he 
performed the contract. Michael breached the contract with Ethan and did not 
supply the iron. Ethan may be awarded one of two remedies. One possibility is 
to grant specific performance—that is, to order Michael to supply the iron to 
Ethan. Another possibility is to require Michael to pay Ethan monetary damages 
for all the losses Ethan incurred due to nondelivery of the iron on time, including 
the inconvenience of purchasing substitute iron from another supplier and the 
increase (in the event that there is one) in the market price of iron. 
You have to decide whether to grant specific performance or monetary 
damages. Please choose one of the following options: 
1. I would order specific performance of the contract with Ethan, irrespective of 
the magnitude of Michael’s expected loss from performing the contract. 
2. I would order specific performance of the contract with Ethan, even if 
Michael’s expected loss from performing the contract is high.  
3. I would not order specific performance of the contract with Ethan if Michael’s 
expected loss from performing the contract is high.  
4. I would not order specific performance of the contract with Ethan, even if 
Michael’s expected loss from performing the contract is low.  
5. I would not order specific performance of the contract with Ethan in any case 
but rather an order for monetary damages.  
552 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:505 
 
Scenario 4: Iron-Gain 
Unidentified/Policy-Making Version 
Imagine that you have to lay down the rules that would apply in cases in 
which sellers breach a contract to sell an asset, such as iron products, to buyers. 
Sometimes, after the formation of the contract with a certain buyer, the seller 
finds another buyer who is willing to pay him a higher price for the iron. The 
seller may then decide to breach the contract with the first buyer and sell the iron 
to the second buyer. In such cases, the first buyer may be awarded one of two 
remedies. One possibility is to grant specific performance—that is, to order the 
seller to supply the iron to the first buyer. Another possibility is to require the 
seller to pay the first buyer monetary damages for all the losses the first buyer 
incurred due to nondelivery of the iron on time, including the inconvenience of 
purchasing substitute iron from another supplier and the increase (in the event 
that there is one) in the market price of iron. 
You have to establish guidelines on whether to grant specific performance or 
monetary damages in such cases. Please choose one of the following options: 
1. An order for specific performance of the contract with the first buyer should 
be issued, irrespective of the magnitude of the seller’s expected gain from 
performing the second contract. 
2. An order for specific performance of the contract with the first buyer should 
be issued, even if the seller’s expected gain from performing the second con-
tract is high.  
3. An order for specific performance of the contract with the first buyer should 
not be issued if the seller’s expected gain from performing the second con-
tract is high.  
4. An order for specific performance of the contract with the first buyer should 
not be issued, even if the seller’s expected gain from performing the second 
contract is low.  
5. An order for specific performance of the contract with the first buyer should 
not be issued in any case but rather an order for monetary damages.  
Identified/Decision-Making Version 
Imagine that you have to determine the remedy that would be given in a case 
in which Michael breached a contract to sell iron products to Ethan. After the 
formation of the contract with Ethan, Michael found another buyer who was 
willing to pay him a higher price for the iron. Michael breached the contract with 
Ethan and sold the iron to the second buyer. Ethan may be awarded one of two 
remedies. One possibility is to grant specific performance—that is, to order 
Michael to supply the iron to Ethan. Another possibility is to require Michael to 
pay Ethan monetary damages for all the losses Ethan incurred due to nondelivery 
of the iron on time, including the inconvenience of purchasing substitute iron 
from another supplier and the increase (in the event that there is one) in the 
market price of iron. 
You have to decide whether to grant specific performance or monetary 
damages. Please choose one of the following options: 
1. I would order specific performance of the contract with Ethan, irrespective of 
the magnitude of Michael’s expected gain from performing the second 
contract. 
2. I would order specific performance of the contract with Ethan, even if 
Michael’s expected gain from performing the second contract is high.  
3. I would not order specific performance of the contract with Ethan if Michael’s 
expected gain from performing the second contract is high.  
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4. I would not order specific performance of the contract with Ethan, even if 
Michael’s expected gain from performing the second contract is low.  
5. I would not order specific performance of the contract with Ethan in any case, 
but rather an order for monetary damages.  
Scenario 5: Defamation 
Unidentified/Policy-Making Version 
Imagine that you have to lay down the rules that would apply in cases in 
which people spread lies that besmirch other people’s good name. In such cases, 
the injured party usually suffers not only pecuniary loss but emotional loss, as 
well. The pecuniary loss is to be compensated for in any case by a monetary 
award, and you need to determine which of two possible remedies would be 
awarded for the emotional loss. One possibility is to grant additional monetary 
compensation (that is, to increase the compensation beyond the sum that would 
be given for only the pecuniary loss). Another possibility is to require the injurer 
to issue a public apology in the media. 
You have to establish guidelines on whether to require the injurer in such 
cases to apologize or to increase the compensation sum that he would pay. Please 
choose one of the following options:  
1. The injurer should be required to apologize in any case, rather than increasing 
the compensation amount. 
2. The injurer should be required to apologize if the injured party suffered any 
emotional loss. 
3. The injurer should be required to apologize if the injured party suffered a 
significant emotional loss. 
4. The injurer should be required to apologize if the injured party suffered se-
vere emotional loss. 
5. The injurer should not be required to apologize in any case but rather the 
compensation amount should be increased. 
Identified/Decision-Making Version 
Imagine that you have to determine the remedy that would be given in a case 
in which Benjamin spread lies that besmirched Saul’s good name. Saul has 
suffered not only pecuniary loss but emotional loss, as well. The pecuniary loss 
is to be compensated for in any case by a monetary award, and you need to 
determine which of two possible remedies would be awarded for the emotional 
loss. One possibility is to grant additional monetary compensation (that is, to 
increase the compensation beyond the sum that would be given for only the 
pecuniary loss). Another possibility is to require the injurer to issue a public 
apology in the media. 
You have to decide whether to require Benjamin to apologize, or to increase 
the compensation sum that he would pay. Please choose one of the following 
options:  
1. I would require Benjamin to apologize in any case, rather than increase the 
compensation amount. 
2. I would require Benjamin to apologize if Saul suffered any emotional loss. 
3. I would require Benjamin to apologize if Saul suffered a significant emotional 
loss. 
4. I would require Benjamin to apologize if Saul suffered severe emotional loss. 
5. I would not require Benjamin to apologize in any case but rather increase the 
compensation amount.  
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APPENDIX B 
Scenario 1: Littering in a Park 
Unidentified/Policy-Making Version 
Imagine that you have to lay down the rules that would apply in cases in 
which people litter in public parks. As a rule, littering in a park is subject to a 
fine. However, when determining the fine to be paid, one can take into account 
various factors that would [reduce/increase] the amount to be paid.  
You have to establish guidelines on whether, in such cases, to take into 
account the fact that it is a [first-time/repeat] offense and [reduce/increase] the 
fine to be paid by a person who littered in a park. Please choose one of the 
following options: 
1. I would stipulate that the fine should not be [reduced/increased] at all because 
it is a [first-time/repeat offense] of a litterer.  
2. I would stipulate that the fine should be [reduced/increased] to a small extent 
because it is a [first-time/repeat] offense of a litterer.  
3. I would stipulate that the fine should be [reduced/increased] to a medium ex-
tent because it is a [first-time/repeat] offense of a litterer.  
4. I would stipulate that the fine should be [reduced/increased] to a large extent 
because it is a [first-time/repeat] offense of a litterer.  
5. I would stipulate that the fine should be [reduced/increased] to a very large 
extent because it is a [first-time/repeat] offense of a litterer. 
Identified/Decision-Making Version 
Imagine that you have to determine the fine to be paid by Daniel, who littered 
in a public park. As a rule, littering in a park is subject to a fine. However, when 
determining the fine to be paid, one can take into account various factors that 
would [reduce/increase] the amount to be paid.  
You have to decide whether to take into account the fact that it is a [first-
time/repeat] offense of Daniel and [reduce/increase] the fine that he would pay. 
Please choose one of the following options: 
1. I would not [reduce/increase] the fine at all because it is a [first-time/repeat] 
offense of Daniel, the litterer.  
2. I would [reduce/increase] the fine to a small extent because it is a [first-
time/repeat] offense of Daniel, the litterer.  
3. I would [reduce/increase] the fine to a medium extent because it is a [first-
time/repeat] offense of Daniel, the litterer.  
4. I would [reduce/increase] the fine to a large extent because it is a [first-
time/repeat] offense of Daniel, the litterer.  
5. I would [reduce/increase] the fine to a very large extent because it is a [first-
time/repeat] offense of Daniel, the litterer.  
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Scenario 2: Building Violation 
Unidentified/Policy-Making Version 
Imagine that you have to lay down the rules that would apply in cases in 
which people build something contrary to the conditions of a building permit that 
they have received. As a rule, building contrary to a building permit is subject to 
a fine. However, when determining the fine to be paid, one can take into account 
various factors that would [reduce/increase] the amount to be paid.  
You have to establish guidelines on whether, in such cases, to take into 
account the fact that it is a [first-time/repeat] offense and [reduce/increase] the 
fine to be paid by a person who built contrary to the conditions of a building 
permit. Please choose one of the following options: 
1. I would stipulate that the fine should not be [reduced/increased] at all because 
it is a [first-time/repeat] offense of a builder.  
2. I would stipulate that the fine should be [reduced/increased] to a small extent 
because it is a [first-time/repeat] offense of a builder.  
3. I would stipulate that the fine should be [reduced/increased] to a medium ex-
tent because it is a [first-time/repeat] offense of a builder.  
4. I would stipulate that the fine should be [reduced/increased] to a large extent 
because it is a [first-time/repeat] offense of a builder.  
5. I would stipulate that the fine should be [reduced/increased] to a very large 
extent because it is a [first-time/repeat] offense of a builder. 
Identified/Decision-Making Version 
Imagine that you have to determine the fine to be paid by Daniel, who built 
something contrary to the conditions of the building permit that he had received. 
As a rule, building contrary to a building permit is subject to a fine. However, 
when determining the fine to be paid, one can take into account various factors 
that would [reduce/increase] the amount to be paid.  
You have to decide whether to take into account the fact that it is a [first-
time/repeat] offense of Daniel and [reduce/increase] the fine that he would pay. 
Please choose one of the following options: 
1. I would not [reduce/increase] the fine at all because it is a [first-time/repeat] 
offense of Daniel, the builder.  
2. I would [reduce/increase] the fine to a small extent because it is a [first-
time/repeat] offense of Daniel, the builder.  
3. I would [reduce/increase] the fine to a medium extent because it is a [first-
time/repeat] offense of Daniel, the builder.  
4. I would [reduce/increase] the fine to a large extent because it is a [first-
time/repeat] offense of Daniel, the builder.  
5. I would [reduce/increase] the fine to a very large extent because it is a [first-
time/repeat] offense of Daniel, the builder.  
 
